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This thesis examines Finland’s relations with Britain and the United States from 1939-
1941. During this period, Finland engaged in two wars against the Soviet Union. In 1939-1940 
Finland defended itself against a Soviet attack with the emotional and material support of Britain 
and the United States. By 1941 Finland was once again at war with the Soviet Union. The 
geopolitical situation had changed so significantly that Finland found itself aligned with 
Germany against the Soviet Union. Consequently Finnish relations with the western democracies 
were strained, although Britain and the United States had previously supported Finland against 
the Soviet Union. This thesis examines the differences in foreign policy and public opinion in 
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 On November 30, 1939, Soviet troops interrupted the relative quiet of the ‘phoney war’ 
when they crossed the border into Finland. At a time when Britain, France and Germany were 
technically at war but thus far remained inactive, this blatant act of Soviet aggression caused an 
explosion of activity amongst the international press. The world followed this remarkable event 
to its conclusion – the first sustained action of the Second World War. Over 300 foreign 
correspondents in Finland covered what came to be known as the ‘Winter War.’1 Though 
Finland was previously little known to much of the world, throughout the winter of 1939-1940 
readers around the globe anxiously followed stories of the heroic little nation battling alone in 
the cold north against the Soviet Union. The Winter War distracted the west from the trepidation 
of war with Germany. Although the Winter War was an isolated affair, the international press 
and much of western public opinion associated the Finnish struggle with the global struggle 
against aggression, and found inspiration in the valour of Finnish resistance.  
 The Winter War is renowned because of its popularity in the west and the phenomenal 
successes of the small Scandinavian neutral against the military power of the Red Army. 
However, the sequel to the Winter War that began in June 1941 is virtually unknown to the 
western public. In 1941 Finland once again engaged the Soviet Union under much different 
circumstances: Russia was now a member of the Grand Alliance, while the Finnish cause was 
sponsored by Nazi Germany. Britain, who had been one of Finland’s chief supporters in 1939-





now turned on Finland, labelling it a betrayer and an ‘agent of aggression.’ The United States did 
not declare war, but Finnish-American relations underwent serious tension in 1941-1944. 
 The purpose of this study is to investigate the nature of Finnish support in the west and to 
understand why it underwent such a dramatic reversal in 1941. This study will argue that the 
overall geopolitical situation in 1941, rather than exact nature of the Finnish struggle, was the 
primary factor for souring the traditionally strong relations between Finland and the western 
democracies. When the Red Army invaded Finland in 1939, Stalin acted on the conditions of a 
secret protocol in the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. Although a military alliance did not 
exist between Germany and the Soviet Union, public opinion in the west perceived the Soviet 
Union to be aligned with Hitler in the European war because of the Non-Aggression Pact, the 
Nazi-Soviet partition of Poland in 1939, and its aggression in the Baltic region. Consequently, 
the west perceived the Winter War to be a clear-cut case of good versus evil, in which Finland 
fought on the side of the Allies in the war against world-wide aggression.  
 By 1941, the geopolitical shift caused by the failure of British war policy in Scandinavia 
and the German invasion of the Soviet Union brought with it a shift in allegiances and, 
subsequently, a shift in western attitudes toward Finland. The perspective of the British public 
was inseparable from its own war and thus when the Soviet Union became an ally of Britain, 
Finland became an enemy. The exact nature of the Finnish war, whether it was just or whether 
Finland had other options, was inconsequential to British opinion. The only fact that mattered 
was that Finland was at war with Britain’s ally with the support of Britain’s enemy.  
 This study also explores the contrast in the attitudes and foreign policy of Britain and the 
United States in their respective relations with Finland from 1939-1941. It argues that their 
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vastly different worldviews, as well as roles in the Second World War, led to very distinctive 
relationships with Finland. British policy toward Finland was determined by political realism, 
power politics, and the situation on the fronts. Finland was relatively unimportant to London, and 
because of Britain’s heritage of imperialism and penchant for power politics, the British War 
Cabinet approached both Finnish wars looking for a way to use Finland to its strategic 
advantage.  
United States’ policy and public opinion was more idealistic, along the lines of the 
Atlantic Charter. The United States valued such concepts as political and economic liberalism, 
the right of self-determination, and opposition to totalitarianism. America believed that a liberal 
international economy was essential for American prosperity and that spheres of influence could 
potentially limit American commerce. As a small liberal democracy at war with America’s 
ideological nemesis, Finland came to represent American ideals of the promotion and defence of 
democracy and liberal capitalism.2 This positive image of Finland based on shared values 
survived the duration of the war, even when Finnish and American national interests became 
diametrically opposed. United States public opinion influenced Washington’s foreign policy, 
which was sympathetic to Finland’s situation. Even though the United States accepted the Soviet 
Union as an ally against a more immediate threat, it tolerated the Finnish war against the Soviet 
Union because the Finns fought for independence: a principle consistent with American values.  
Although the second Finnish war lasted until 1944, this study looks primarily at Finnish 
relations with the western democracies in 1939-1941 because those were the most relevant years 






their respective policies toward Finland from June to December 1941. After 1941, Finland drew 
up defensive positions and its relations with Britain and the United States remained mainly static 
until 1944. 
The English-language historiography on the Finnish-Soviet wars is sparse. As of yet, no 
historian has made a comparative analysis of Finnish relations with the western democracies 
from 1939-1941. Most literature is devoted either to narratives of the Winter War or Finland’s 
road to co-belligerency with Germany, whereas Finnish-western relations are little more than a 
side note. Even the most comprehensive studies only cover certain aspects of this topic. Travis 
Beal Jacobs looks exclusively at American-Finnish relations in the Winter War, whereas R. 
Michael Berry looks at relations between these two states from 1941-1944.3 Jukka Nevakivi and 
Thomas Munch-Petersen examine the roles of Britain and France during the Winter War.4 
Anthony Upton and Peter H. Krosby provide a detailed history of Finnish-German relations in 
1940-1941; examine the conflicting pressures of Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union; and 
discuss the limited options available to a small state that pursues national interests amidst a great 
power conflict.5  
The history of Anglo-Finnish relations is particularly unexplored. There is currently no 
comprehensive analysis of Anglo-American attitudes toward Finland in 1939-1941. This study is 











cabinet and Parliamentary debates; public opinion polls; memoirs and diaries; and newspapers 
and journals of the United States and Britain. This pioneering comparative study is a contribution 
to the history of Finland. It also sheds light on the public opinion, foreign policy, and power 


















The Road to Intervention: America and the Winter War 
While relaxing on a Caribbean cruise in late February 1940, President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt sent a go-ahead wire to federal lender Jesse Jones, instructing him to authorize a 
twenty-million dollar federal loan to Finland.6 The loan would ultimately come too late to aid 
Finland in its struggle against the Soviet Union; yet it was the first time since isolationists seized 
control of Congress that representatives had passed a measure for direct intervention in a 
European conflict. As the first act of U.S. intervention in the Second World War, the loan 
reflected the growing willingness of Americans to accept a wider role in foreign affairs. 
Americans were so moved by Finland’s resistance to the Soviet attack in 1939 that their 
sympathy for the Finns and outrage and indignation toward the Soviets outweighed their 
aversion to foreign entanglement. Finland and the United States had shared friendly relations and 
mutual respect since President Woodrow Wilson first extended recognition in 1919. In contrast, 
many Americans either despised, or at least distrusted, the Soviet Union’s communist regime. 
This aversion intensified after the Soviet nonaggression treaty with Germany. Because of 
America’s well-established friendship with Finland and anticommunist sentiments, the Finnish 
cause received widespread sympathy from Americans that culminated in limited government 
intervention. 
Throughout the interwar period and into the late 1930s, strong isolationist sentiments 
characterized American attitudes and policies. Their reluctance to become involved in world 






history been so well-informed of foreign affairs or followed world events so closely.7 Neither 
was there any semblance of spiritual neutrality. Americans openly condemned the policies of 
aggressor nations and shared a hatred for all forms of totalitarianism, dictatorship, and religious 
intolerance; yet a spirit of separateness from world affairs persisted. 8 The aftermath of the First 
World War left Americans disillusioned, embittered and committed to nonentanglement in 
foreign wars. Promises of a better future and the safety of American ideals had justified the 
sacrifices of war; yet the country watched as the interwar period gave rise to economic 
depression, international tension, aggression and conflict.9  
A Gallup poll taken in 1937 showed that seventy percent of Americans believed that 
participation in the First World War had been a mistake.10 Americans concluded that the 
European system of alliances and spheres of influences was corrupt and war was inevitable on 
that continent. As William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason pointed out, “Americans, having 
once believed, erroneously, that war would settle everything, were now disposed to endorse the 
reverse fallacy that war could settle nothing.”11 International lawyers reconsidered the traditional 
concept of neutrality in light of America’s experience in the First World War. They concluded 
that nations at war no longer respected neutrality and argued that only more restrictive neutrality 
policies, which limited trade with belligerents, could keep the United States out of future 












. . is to ship munitions of war.”13 These sentiments found public support and culminated in the 
unprecedented legislation of 1935-37. The neutrality laws established strict government control 
over the shipment of munitions, forbade the export of arms or munitions to any belligerent 
nation, and prohibited loans or credit to warring nations.14 
Although international tensions mounted in the late 1930s, isolationist solidarity held. 
Americans were unwilling to involve themselves in world affairs even as Mussolini attacked 
Ethiopia; Hitler reoccupied the Rhineland and annexed Austria and Czechoslovakia; Italy, 
Mexico, Germany, and the Soviet Union intervened in the Spanish Civil War; and Japan invaded 
China. President Roosevelt’s 1937 speech, in which he suggested a ‘quarantine’ against 
aggressor states, elicited an overwhelmingly negative response from the American public. The 
public reaction was reflective of America’s unwillingness to participate with the international 
community to prevent the spread of aggression.15 
The Winter War was part of a series of events that challenged the isolationist argument. 
Although technically neutral and unwilling to become involved, Americans had an emotional 
stake in European affairs. Furthermore, as another European war became imminent, Americans 
grew concerned that neutrality legislation could lead them into a silent partnership with 
aggressor states.16 In July 1939, President Roosevelt asked the Senate to revise the Neutrality Act 








persuade Hitler from further aggression, but his efforts were blocked by the congressional 
dominance of the isolationist/pacifist coalition.17 
The signing of the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact and the outbreak of war validated 
internationalist arguments and changed the power equation between Roosevelt and his 
isolationist opponents.18 Although the debate was still intense, faith that there would be no war in 
Europe had collapsed, and the nonaggression pact evoked strong sympathy for democracies.19 A 
Gallup poll taken after the dual invasion of Poland found that eighty-four percent of Americans 
wanted to see the Allies win the war in Europe, fourteen percent had no opinion, and only two 
percent sided with Hitler.20 Fifty-six percent of Americans wanted Congress to repeal the arms 
embargo.21 Immediately prior to the outbreak of war, isolationists had controlled congressional 
foreign policy decisions and blocked Roosevelt’s attempted repeal of the arms embargo. Yet 
after war was declared, they failed to prevail on any major issue.22  
It was within this political climate that the Winter War entered public discourse and left 
its impression on American politics. The Soviet invasion of Finland established further 
emotional, economic and political ties between America and affairs in Europe. After the 
outbreak of war in Europe, internationalists prevailed over isolationists by repealing the arms 











isolationist-internationalist debate to a debate between interventionism and noninterventionism.23 
Finland’s resistance evoked enormous sympathy from the American public. For the first time 
since the neutrality legislation of the 1930s, Congress approved limited government intervention 
in a European conflict.  
American sympathy for the Finnish cause was due to a number of factors. Most 
Americans were predisposed to anticommunist sentiments, which were intensified by the Nazi-
Soviet Pact and the Soviet invasion of Finland; they were impressed with Finland’s defiance of 
the Soviet Union and its initial successes on the battlefield; the United States had long since 
established friendly relations with Finland; and shared values and ideals created a positive image 
of Finland in the United States. Since the First World War, few European nations were viewed 
by the United States in such a favourable light.24  
“We have a particularly friendly feeling for Finland and have a right to,” stated Chairman 
Pittman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in October 1939. “It has demonstrated its 
friendship and its scrupulous sense of honor.”25 After Woodrow Wilson’s recognition of Finland 
in 1919 it rapidly gained respect in the United States.26 Through the 1920s Finland demonstrated 
capitalist and democratic ideals that resonated with Americans. Through progressive agrarian 
reform legislation, Finland enabled nearly ninety percent of its farmers to become independent 












an average of four-hundred percent during the interwar period and industrial production also 
experienced significant growth.28 Finland received further publicity with the success of its 
Olympic athletes. Paavo Nurmi, a long-distance runner, broke records in America and later 
became the symbol of the 1940 Olympic Games, scheduled for Helsinki.29 In addition, Finnish 
immigrants had established many thriving Finnish-American communities in places such as 
Michigan’s Upper Peninsula, parts of the Midwest, and Florida. 
The primary cause of American respect for Finland prior to the Winter War was the 
payment of the Finnish debt. At the close of the First World War, Finland experienced food 
shortages. In 1919 it bought $9,000,000 worth of U.S. food.30 In 1923, as representatives of 
various countries began coming to Washington to make refunding agreements, Finland was the 
first nation to make arrangements on its debt. Although economic depression strained 
international relations, Finland and America maintained a model relationship. Furthermore, when 
other nations defaulted on their loans in the 1930s, Finland remained the only country to 
continually make payments toward its war debt.31 Although the Finnish debt was relatively 
small, the United States was impressed with Finland’s integrity. The New York Times declared 
that, “Finland, through regular payments of her war debt installments to this country, is very 
popular in the United States.”32 Senator Clark, a Democrat of Idaho, went as far as to state that 











status as “the U.S.’s only non-welshing ‘war debtor.’”34 “In Washington, if nowhere else in the 
U.S.,” Time further mentioned, “Finland is the national baby of 1939 that has taken the place of 
1914 Baby Belgium.”35 
 Overwhelming sympathy for Finland in the Winter War was not only due to favourable 
relations between the two countries, but to active anticommunism that persisted at all levels in 
the United States. Before 1939 Americans passively disapproved of the Soviet system. However, 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact produced a spike in anticommunist hostility in the United States. 
The politically right-wing journal The New Republic even asserted that Americans sympathized 
with the Finnish cause “not because they love Finland but because they hate Russia.”36 
Americans disliked the Soviet Union because they felt its communist regime threatened their 
cherished values of capitalism, religion and democracy.37 From the Russian Revolution in 1917, 
throughout the 1930s, and even after the United States had recognized the Soviet Union in 1933, 
Americans remained suspicious, and the American press continually scorned the regime.38 
Throughout the 1930s the Soviet Union failed to fulfill its recognition pledges. It strained 
relations with the United States by spreading propaganda.39 It also refused to provide the United 
States with most-favoured-nation treatment in commercial relations.40 Negotiations over Russia’s 












Secretary of State Cordell Hull stated in his memoirs that “We had official relations with 
Moscow but they rested on no bedrock of friendship and cooperation.”42 
Anticommunist sentiments were particularly strong among Catholics and most of 
American Protestants, conservatives, the American Federation of Labor, and most patriotic 
organizations.43 Catholics considered communism to be a direct assault on the foundations of the 
Church.44 The 1930s marked an increasing obsession with communism in the Catholic 
community, and as David O’Brien states a “sometimes paranoic concern with the Soviet menace, 
at home and abroad [sic].”45 Recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933 generated widespread 
disapproval from Catholics, and unanimous opposition from the Catholic press.46 Editor of the 
Sign, Reverend Harold Purcell, wrote in 1933 that Catholics must do what they could “to prevent 
our Christian Government from entering into diplomatic or trade relations with the anti-Christ 
and anti-God Bolsheviks.”47 After Germany and the Soviet Union had signed the nonaggression 
pact, Father Coughlin, an influential Catholic leader, proclaimed in his weekly radio show that 
“two abominable systems have pledged their mutual support . . . Now the forces of anti-God and 
anti-Christ have consolidated.”48 Coughlin continued to equate the “forces of anti-Christ” as “the 
red and brown bolshevism of the north” born from the “unholy loins” of evil.49 He further 













Christianity?”50 Protestants likewise considered ‘Godless communism’ to be a danger to 
American principles. Many churches issued public condemnations.51 
Americans, even liberals, widely feared communism and shared distaste for the Soviet 
Union.52 By the late 1930s, Americans began to merge images of communism and fascism. To 
Americans, they both represented repression, aggression, terror, totalitarianism, and a general 
affront to American values.53 The term “red fascism” that became popular during the Cold War 
was actually born out of the late 1930s.54 A Gallup poll from June 1938, a year prior to the 
nonaggression pact, found that Americans considered communism worse than fascism.55 After 
the nonaggression pact, this tendency to equate communism and fascism and to see the Soviet 
Union as an enemy became even more common.  
The New York Times referred to the nonaggression pact as a “gross betrayal.”56 It echoed 
popular notions that the Soviet Union was indeed an enemy and claimed that the two aggressor 
states had entered a “virtual alliance.”57 The dual invasion of Poland shocked Americans and 
they viewed it as evidence of Nazi-Soviet compatibility.58 Public discourse in America blurred 
the two ‘isms’ as a dual threat to western democracies, regardless of their opposing ideologies. 














is red fascism...the only real ‘ideological’ issue is one between democracy, liberty and peace on 
the one hand and despotism, terror and war on the other.”59  
Their fears confirmed by world events, Americans clearly favoured drastic action against 
domestic communists from 1939-1941. In December 1939 public opinion polls indicated that 
seventy-five percent of Americans wanted Congress to sponsor the Dies Committee for at least 
another year.60 The Dies Committee, established in May 1938, had been given authority to 
investigate subversive and ‘un-American’ propaganda.61 Fifty-three percent thought that an 
investigation of communist activities in the United States warranted highest priority, compared 
with only twenty-three percent who were more concerned with Nazi activities.62 Gallup polls 
from 1939-1940 indicated that fifty-two percent of Americans were in favour of “doing away” 
with the Communist Party in the United States and the majority believed that it was under orders 
from Moscow.63 Seventy-three percent believed that it should be illegal for communists to hold 
public office.64 A Roper/Fortune survey demonstrated that eighty-eight percent of Americans 
wanted government action against “communist sympathizers.” Of those polled, thirty-eight 
percent favoured deporting or jailing them, fifty percent wanted the government to keep track of 












Much of the legal and administrative groundwork for the McCarthy era had roots in the 
anticommunism of the late 1930s, which reached a peak from 1939-1940.66 Fear of a possible 
communist fifth column led to political sniping and red baiting. The Hatch Act, passed in 1939, 
denied federal employment to members of any organization that advocated overthrowing the 
government, and was applied to include the Communist Party.67 The government came down 
hard on domestic communists during the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Communist Party members received 
unusually stiff jail sentences and were indicted for crimes that would typically go unnoticed, and 
strikes incited sharp government reaction.68 
Americans watched in concern as events led up to the Winter War. The New York Times 
echoed suspicions of a “secret understanding” behind the nonaggression pact that would 
precipitate a Soviet “partition of Rumania or a more extended drive on the Balkan states.”69 As 
Lithuania and Estonia were absorbed, the New York Times referred to Stalin as “something more 
than an apt imitator of Hitler” and predicted that his actions “foreshadowed” what was in store 
for the other Baltic states.70 The paper, as events unfolded, expressed fear that an invasion of 
Finland could lead to a “Soviet surge” in Scandinavia which “could mean . . . the extinction of 
Western civilization in all that region.”71 Widespread anticommunist sentiments and friendly 
relations with Finland combined to evoke enormous American sympathy for the Finnish cause. 
In the fall of 1939 Stalin presented a list of demands to Finland on the basis of 










inevitably attack the Soviet Union, and because of Finland’s geography, it was a potential base 
of operations for an outside power. For this reason, it was essential to Soviet security that the 
Finns cede enough territory to the Soviet Union so that Leningrad would be out of artillery range 
from the Finnish side. Stalin also demanded that Finland cede the islands in the Gulf of Finland, 
the western part of the Fisherman’s Peninsula near Petsamo, and the peninsula near Hanko on 
Finland’s southern coast.72 
The Soviet Union threatened Finland but most observers doubted that Stalin would resort 
to war in violation of Finland’s neutrality.73 The Finnish Foreign Minister Eljas Erkko stated, “I 
am convinced that the Russian Government does not want anything to happen any more than we 
do.”74 Finland assumed it would be protected by its neutral status. Stalin’s refusal to respect the 
rights of a neutral was particularly unnerving to Americans. “There is no secret made of the 
concern with which Russian penetration of Finland would be regarded here,” stated the New 
York Times on October 12. “She is held to represent Western civilization . . . and her absorption 
by Russia, it is believed, would cause a wave of resentment greater even than was the case when 
Poland was overrun.”75 
The Soviet invasion of Finland on November 30, 1939 ignited immediate and widespread 
outrage in the United States. If Americans held anticommunist views before, this unprovoked 
attack brought those sentiments to new heights. Ambassador William Phillips wrote in his diary 
“I can imagine nothing which could bring about greater indignation in America against the 








admiration and respect.”76 The American press unanimously condemned the attack. The Los 
Angeles Times decried the “monstrous Russian aggression” and praised “plucky little Finland” 
for its stand.77 The New York Times called the attack a “red blitzkrieg,” and equated the invasion 
of Finland to Hitler’s actions in Europe.78 In Washington, the Post accused Stalin of waging war 
“for the extension of communism,” and voiced concerns of communist subversion in the United 
States.79 “By invading Finland,” stated the Hartford Courant, “the Soviet Union has stripped the 
last mask off its belligerent imperialism,” an act “more reprehensible than the conduct of 
Germany toward Poland.”80 “In bold, crude, barefaced mendacity,” proclaimed the New York 
Herald Tribune, “the Government of the Soviet Union” has “no peer in history.”81  
The Winter War generated a strong emotional tie to international events in a nation that 
desired to remain uninvolved in world affairs. American moral indignation over the invasion of 
Finland had reached a peak of intensity unmatched since the German invasion of Belgium in 
1914. Even isolationists were moved.82 “The change in public opinion here is remarkable,” 
Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle wrote in his diary five days after the invasion. “The 
Russian invasion of Finland seems to have stopped everyone in their tracks . . . The pacifists of 
last month are urging all kinds of measures against Russia. Plainly, the neutrality of this country 
is not as solid as it was a week ago.”83 A Gallup poll from December 1939 indicated that eighty-













sympathized with neither, and only two percent of Americans sympathized with the Soviet 
Union.84  
To the astonishment of Americans and the entire world, the Finnish Army put up 
effective resistance. Finnish valour impressed Americans and elicited even more enthusiastic 
support as the David and Goliath struggle captured the national imagination. “In the long record 
of human courage,” wrote The Washington Post, “there has been nothing more heroic than the 
stand which Finland, with a total population less than that of North Carolina, is making against a 
country with as many inhabitants as North and South America combined.” The Post went on to 
state that Finnish resistance “defends against destruction the ideals and standards on which the 
United States was built.”85  
As it became clear that the Finnish Army would continue to hold at least temporarily, 
Americans saw an opportunity to help. Newspapers demanded not only humanitarian, but 
economic and military aid. “People who last fall were denouncing ‘that madman in the White 
House who is trying to get us into war,’” Time wrote, “were now impatient with merely feeding 
& clothing the Finns. ‘Bullets, not butter,’ was their cry.”86 The New York Times argued for an 
immediate loan of “planes and cannon,” and other military necessities.87 The Washington Post 
claimed that a defence loan for war supplies would meet “unquestionable” support from the 









Street Journal declared that Finland “must – and will – receive support from neutral countries as 
well as from Britain and France.”89  
The American Red Cross, and the hastily created Finnish Relief Fund chaired by former 
president Herbert Hoover, immediately began to provide aid and solicit assistance. Enthusiastic 
support greeted both groups.90 Hoover declared a “Finland Day” on December 11 and by the 
following day over 1,200 daily newspapers had offered to act as collection agencies.91 The 
Finnish Relief Fund alone managed to raise $3,500,000 for Finland and there were several 
organizations at work besides Hoover’s.92 Major General John O’Ryan started a drive for 
“Fighting-Funds for Finland” with the goal of $10,000,000 and managed to raise over $300,000 
in less than three weeks.93 Labour unions observed Finnish Labor Day and raised $200,000 while 
American industries raised a further $600,000 dollars.94 Time declared that “a U.S. citizen who 
had neither danced, knitted, orated, played bridge, bingo, banqueted or just shelled out for 
Finland was simply nowhere socially.”95 Americans formed committees, collected, and 
sponsored concerts, auctions, balls, dinners, benefits and theatricals to raise money. As Time 
stated, “Finland was the fashion.”96 
Although officially neutral throughout the Winter War, the U.S. Government, like the 
American public, were far from neutral in spirit. Throughout the development and course of the 












since recognition.97 Isolationist control of Congress eroded further as America’s involvement in 
foreign affairs progressed from mere sympathy to a policy of intervention. Moral indignation, the 
desire to help Finland, and public demand eventually prodded Congress into limited intervention 
against an aggressor for the first time in the Second World War. 
Finland first inquired about the possibility of a loan in September 1939, after the Nazi-
Soviet invasion of Poland. Worried about Soviet aggression, Foreign Minister Hjalmar Procope 
asked Secretary Hull for a military loan of $50 to $60 million.98 However, Washington did not 
want to aggravate the Soviet Union. Hull especially urged caution, for although much of 
America regarded the Soviet Union as a virtual enemy, he did not want to risk pushing it further 
into the arms of Germany. “I could not but feel that the basic antagonisms between Communist 
Russia and Nazi Germany were so deep, and Hitler’s ambitions so boundless, that eventually 
Russia would come over to the side of the Allies,” Hull explained in his memoirs. “We had to be 
careful not to push her in the other direction.”99 American action in the Winter War was 
therefore restrained by Hull’s cautious policy to “retain as good relations with the Soviet Union 
as possible, and avoid the impression that the United States was either a present or a potential 
enemy.”100 
Although Finland repeatedly asked for loans as the Soviet Union expanded into the Baltic 
region, Washington chose a more prudent course of action. On October 12 Roosevelt issued a 
message to Moscow stating that “the President expresses the earnest hope that the Soviet Union 









of amicable and peaceful relations between the two countries, and the independence of each.”101 
The press release was greeted with widespread approval throughout the public and in 
Congress.102 “For a friendly, gallant, self-respecting and greatly respected republic in peril of its 
life,” the New York Times commented, “we could hardly do less.”103 
Roosevelt’s message received stern criticism from Foreign Commissar Molotov. He 
stated that it was “in violation of American neutrality,” and reminded Roosevelt that the Soviet 
Union had given Finland its independence in 1917 but that the Philippines had yet to receive 
theirs from the United States.104 Molotov’s comments immediately provoked a sharp reaction in 
the United States and may have influenced the Congressional debate on neutrality revision. 
Earlier in October, Democrat Representative Luther Johnson of Texas had noted that the 
continued Russian expansion westward was resulting in unfavourable reaction toward 
Congressional isolationists in their home districts.105 Several House changes had been made in 
favour of repeal, and Johnson attributed them to developments in the Baltic region.106 After 
Molotov rebuked the President, the commissar’s remarks evoked a response from Capitol Hill. 
Since Molotov had emphatically stated his desire for the United States to retain its embargo, 
many representatives reacted aversely. Representative John McCormack of Massachusetts 
changed his position on the embargo, stating that “as Americans we should put our country in a 












penalize those that stand for the existence . . . of democracy.”107 Congress did not want an arms 
embargo that favoured aggressor states and on November 3, agreed on a final version of the 
neutrality legislation.108  
Although his previous statements had achieved nothing more than rebuttal, Roosevelt 
issued yet another statement on November 29, motivated by an increasingly aggressive Soviet 
posture. “This Government is following with serious concern the intensification of the Finnish-
Soviet dispute,” read the statement Hull sent to Moscow. “It would view with extreme regret any 
extension of the present area of war and the consequent further deterioration of international 
relations.” The telegram further appealed that “Without in any way becoming involved in the 
merits of the dispute, and limiting its interest to the solution of the dispute by peaceful processes 
only, this Government would, if agreeable to both parties, gladly extend its good offices.”109 The 
Finnish government gladly accepted the American offer but the Soviet Union found no need for 
good offices.110 
Roosevelt, like his fellow Americans, reacted in outrage to the Soviet attack. He called it 
a “dreadful rape” and confirmed that “The whole of the United States is not only horrified but 
thoroughly angry.”111 At a press conference on December 1, he stated that “it is tragic to see the 
policy of force spreading, and to realize that wanton disregard for law is still on the march.” He 










military force as the arbiter of international differences.”112 In a telegram to the Soviet Union he 
asserted, “The ruthless bombing from the air of civilians . . . has sickened the hearts of every 
man and woman, and has profoundly shocked the conscious of humanity.” His statement called 
upon the Soviet Union, asking them “publically to affirm its determination that its armed forces 
shall in no event and under no circumstances, undertake the bombardment from the air of civilian 
populations or of unfortified cities.”113 His statements received widespread approval, although 
Time complained that his words “lagged far behind U.S. public opinion.”114 
In the political sphere, the Soviet attack on Finland immediately led to demands that the 
United States break off diplomatic ties with Moscow.115 Republicans led the assault.116 Senator 
King of Utah stated, “My country will no longer grasp the bloody hands of Stalin,” while Senator 
Vandenberge asserted, “There is no rational alternative except to drive every trace of 
Communism and Naziism out of the U.S [sic].” Herbert Hoover asked, “Why all this tenderness 
toward Russia?”117 Republicans also seized the opportunity to attack the administration.118 They 
made their denunciations retroactive and insisted that the administration should never have 


















Yet Roosevelt moved cautiously. He preferred to utter protests on Finland’s behalf rather 
than to take decisive action against the Soviet Union to avoid the risk of solidifying the 
nonaggression treaty.120 Furthermore, a break of diplomatic ties would deprive the United States 
of a useful source of intelligence, hinder any future possibilities to influence events through 
diplomatic channels, and ultimately would not aid Finland. In February, a motion for the recall of 
the American Ambassador was defeated by the narrow margin of 108 to 105 in the House of 
Representatives.121 Such an impulsive proposal reflected the general mood.122 
Although the Roosevelt administration was genuinely concerned for Finland, it was in no 
position to help. Relations with the Soviet Union had already reached a low point and the 
broader considerations of the war in Europe required Roosevelt to act cautiously. Furthermore, 
Hull anticipated that if the administration proposed a loan, Congressional isolationists might 
consider such assistance as the first step toward helping England and France.123 Yet at the 
suggestion of the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, the administration arranged for a 
credit of $10,000,000 from the Export-Import Bank. A larger loan would have had to be 
approved by Congress.124 Roosevelt, although hesitant to take action against the Soviet Union, 
also declared a “moral embargo.” On December 2 he stated his hope that U.S. manufacturers 
would not export airplanes and airplane equipment, including all materials used in the 










not mention the Soviet Union by name.125 He also personally intervened to help Finnish attempts 
to purchase war material, which had been previously unsuccessful because American 
manufactures were already overburdened by orders.126 On behalf of Finland, he convinced the 
United States Navy to yield priority on 44 Brewster pursuit planes.127 
The public was overwhelmingly supportive of Roosevelt’s actions. Yet as the Finns 
continued to resist the Soviet advance, newspapers, Members of Congress, and much of the 
public demanded further action. “Finland needs guns, not butter,” proclaimed the Wall Street 
Journal, and went on to encourage Americans to subscribe to a private loan for military 
defence.128 Americans also debated the possibility and nature of a large government loan because 
it was unclear how aid could be consistent with neutrality. Some demanded an immediate 
military loan and others a non-military loan.  
Many Americans were evidently more concerned with preventing communist aggression 
and aiding Finland than maintaining strict neutrality. The repeal of the arms embargo symbolized 
America’s sympathy for the Allies and lack of spiritual neutrality. Yet during the Winter War 
that sentiment intensified. A Gallup poll taken in December 1939 showed that fifty-five percent 
of Americans believed that the government should directly intervene by lending Finland 
$60,000,000 to purchase military supplies in the United States: approximately the same 
percentage of Americans who in October supported repeal of the arms embargo.129 Secretary 










don’t know whether it is neutral or unneutral, but I don’t know where we could spend $50 
million to better advantage than to give it to the Finns to fight our battle to keep these fellows 
[the Russians] from getting to the Atlantic.” He expressed blind fear that “once they get to the 
Atlantic, God help England and then we are in the soup . . . if we don’t do it . . . goodby Finland, 
goodby Sweden, goodby Norway [sic].”130  
Although Roosevelt privately supported a loan to Finland, he withheld administration 
endorsement from any bill for aid to Finland introduced in Congress. He was influenced by the 
always cautious Secretary Hull, and was reluctant to expose himself to congressional attack 
during an election year.131 Instead, Roosevelt let Congress take the initiative.132 The bill, 
submitted by Senator Prentiss M. Brown, was introduced on January 8, 1940.133 
Without the leadership of the president, the bill remained under debate in Congress from 
January 8 until February 28, 1940, yet it passed nonetheless.134 However, support for the bill 
waned when it became obvious that a Soviet victory was inevitable.135 In its final altered form, 
the bill consisted of an increase in the funds of the Export-Import Bank and an allocation of 
$20,000,000 to Finland, none of it to be used for the purchase of arms or munitions.136  
Finland needed immediate aid in the form of military supplies. The loan certainly 
symbolized America’s good intentions but it did nothing for Finland’s most pressing needs. In 











than Finland, for it marked a turning point in congressional discourse. In 1939 internationalists 
and isolationists had debated whether to maintain the ban on munitions sales. In the neutrality 
revision that followed, Congress shifted from an isolationist stance to an internationalist stance. 
International events, including Soviet expansion in the Baltic region and undeniably American 
sympathy for Britain and France, coincided to weaken isolationist control of Congress: they 
failed to prevail on any major decision after August 1939. After the Soviet Union attacked 
Finland, Congress moved further still from isolationism. It moved from the internationalist-
isolationist debate, and entered a debate between interventionists and noninterventionists: a 
debate which interventionists ultimately won.137  
At the special session in which the arms embargo was repealed, only indirect aid by 
private American businesses was approved.138 On February 28, 1940, for the first time since 
isolationists took control of Congress, a measure for direct federal intervention in a European 
conflict was passed to aid the victim of an aggressor state. Although they rejected military aid, 
representatives and the American people were more supportive of limited federal intervention in 
the conflict between Finland and the Soviet Union than they had been for repeal of the arms 
embargo.139 A Gallup poll showed that by February, fifty-eight percent of Americans favoured 
the loan, although Finland’s military situation was clearly hopeless by that point.140  
The Winter War demonstrates the pre-Cold War strength of anticommunism in the 








Russia.141 The conflict strengthened anticommunism further still. Republicans attacked 
Roosevelt’s domestic policies through retrospective denunciation of Soviet recognition, similar 
to the way they would denounce the Yalta Agreements in the 1950s. Furthermore, 
interventionists concentrated on ideological considerations to help pass the measure for 
intervention, which for some, no doubt, was a motivating factor. “To hell with Stalin and to hell 
with Hitler! . . . the Finns . . . are fighting to stop anti-Christ and the hosts of hell led by 
Beelzebub,” shouted Michigan’s Representative John Dingell moments before the House passed 
the measure at a vote of 168 in favour with only 51 opposed.142 
“Mum or numb were 1939’s Isolationists,” Time stated in March 1940. “Whether 
America likes it or not, she has become involved in the worldwide struggle for the preservation 
of democracy . . . the Finnish loan makes a precedent that cannot possibly be erased and marks a 
milestone America’s course of alleged isolation.143 As Max Jakobson remarks, the Winter War 
was part of “the challenge to isolation:” one of several incidents that eventually led to the end of 
isolationism.144 The emotional response to the Soviet attack on a neutral country that Americans 
so respected helped erode the barriers that they had erected to prevent foreign entanglements.145 
The Finns won over both internationalists and isolationists and formed a bond of friendship with 
Americans that would survive the duration of the Second World War. The Brown Act was an 
incomplete victory for interventionists because it approved only a non-military loan; but it 
demonstrated that America had grown more willing to become involved in world events. It is a 









direct participation in the Second World War. However, despite this setback for the isolationists, 
the renewed fighting between Finland and Russia in 1941 would eventually become a pillar of 


















Chapter 2:  
Britain and the Winter War 
“Finland was regarded as an important piece in the strategy of the Western powers,” 
stated former Foreign Minister of Finland Vaino Tanner in his memoirs. “To be sure, we 
ourselves had never imagined that their aid was offered to us for the sake of our fine blue eyes.” 
To the United States, the Winter War posed only legal and moral problems because it remained 
aloof from the European war. American limited intervention was an emotional response 
motivated by sympathy for the Finnish cause. Although Britain shared genuine sympathy for the 
Finns, London could not afford to take such a lofty approach to the Finnish conflict.146 The 
United States had no vital interests at stake in Scandinavia. In contrast, because of Britain’s own 
involvement in the war, its policy toward Finland was dictated by political realism, opportunism 
and considerations of vital national interest. Britain formed its policy toward the Winter War 
through the prism of its own war with Germany. Britain’s motives and purposes for aiding 
Finland differed from those of the United States.  Britain aided Finland not out of sympathy but 
because of geopolitical considerations. Aid to Finland was politically expedient, both 
domestically and globally; it served vital interests and furthered Britain’s cause in the Second 
World War. 
Sympathies aside, London had more interests at stake than the independence of a small 
neutral country in northern Europe. Pre-war negotiations, power politics and ‘horse-trading’ with 
the Soviet Union demonstrate that Britain would not hesitate to sacrifice the independence of 





Germany occupied Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939 and Italy invaded Albania only days 
later, this new series of aggression prompted London and Paris to approach Moscow on April 18, 
despite their suspicion of Stalin’s motives.147 The Soviet Union welcomed their proposals for 
cooperation and suggested a pact of mutual assistance between all three powers. Included in its 
proposal, the Soviet Union demanded the right to guarantee its neighbours, from the Baltic to the 
Black Sea, from eventual German aggression. The states bordering the Soviet Union 
immediately objected.148 The Finnish government followed the talks with anxiety, and protested 
against the proposed Soviet guarantee, concerned that a Soviet guarantee would immediately be 
followed by demands to meddle in Finnish affairs.149 
On May 15, Soviet Foreign Minister V.V. Molotov made it clear that Moscow considered 
Finland not a Nordic state, but part of the Baltic group to which the Soviet Union wished to 
extend guarantees.150 The British Ambassador in Russia, Sir William Seeds, disputed Molotov’s 
assertion but also cautioned Molotov to avoid any measures that might arouse Finnish suspicions 
and cause Finland to accept a guarantee from Germany. Molotov in turn suggested that the 
association of Great Britain and France with the Soviet Union would weaken Finland’s 
suspicions.151 As a result of Molotov’s uncompromising attitude, the British Foreign Office 
seriously considered ending the talks. The Foreign Office feared that an agreement with the 










a very low estimation of the Soviet Union’s capacity to wage war.152 Nevertheless, London and 
Paris wished to avoid a pact between the Soviet Union and Germany, and guarantees to Poland 
and Rumania against German aggression would be empty without Soviet backing. Above all, if 
there was to be a war, the western powers wanted desperately to involve the Soviet Union, lest at 
the end of the war, with England and Germany weakened, it would be in a position to dominate 
Europe.153 
Molotov communicated to London that the Soviet Union required without exception, as 
vital to its own security, the right to defend against aggression those countries bordering the 
Soviet Union. An agreement with the Soviet Union could therefore only be bought at the expense 
of the border countries – including Finland.154 Fear of an impending Soviet-German agreement 
and domestic pressure coincided with French demands to reach an agreement on almost any 
terms.155 Towards the end of June, the British government ceded to nearly all of Molotov’s 
demands. In cooperation with France, it submitted a formula that gave the Soviet government the 
right to decide upon the need of “assisting” its neighbouring countries.156 Britain even agreed to 
assist the Soviet Union if the event that it wished to ‘rescue’ one of its neighbours.157  
All that remained was for Britain to convince the Finns to look with goodwill on the 
negotiations and write off any theoretical disadvantages as the price to ensure peace;158 yet the 












publically stated that the Finnish government would regard as an aggressor any state that would 
guarantee Finland against its will.160 This Finnish attitude stubbornly persisted through the 
remainder of the war and the Finnish government authorized a significant increase in spending 
towards defence-works against the Soviet Union.161 As far as Helsinki was concerned, a 
conclusion of terms with the Soviet Union would have brought down the current Finnish 
government, ruined the British position in Finland and thrown the country into German arms.162 
However, a much worse turn of events for Finland occurred with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact 
on August 22, 1939. For the Finns, the power constellation that they most feared became a 
reality; Germany ceded their country to the Soviet sphere of influence and Finland’s only real 
source of outside aid was the ill-prepared western alliance.163  
The Soviet invasion of Finland evoked an outburst of pro-Finnish sympathy in Britain 
that lasted for the duration of the Winter War. Public sympathy, though it necessitated outward 
gestures of support by the British government, did not exceed the level of moral outrage 
expressed by Americans. In contrast to American public opinion, the British public was far less 
anticommunist. British news reporting from 1939-1940 occasionally expressed anticommunist 
sentiments but British indignation toward communism was reserved in comparison to the fiery 
conviction of the American press. Prior to the outbreak of war, the British had heartily responded 
to Winston Churchill’s proposals in the summer of 1939 for an alliance with the Soviet Union to 








orchestrate such an alliance might be the downfall of the Chamberlain government.164 Before the 
Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, the public demonstrated few scruples in regard to the small 
countries of Eastern Europe and were not suspicious of Soviet motives.165  
American sympathy was shaped by anticommunist sentiments and shared values whereas 
the British, engaged in war themselves, viewed the Finnish-Soviet conflict as a component of the 
world war. After the Nazi-Soviet pact, British public opinion turned against the Soviet Union. 
The public tended to interpret the Soviet agreement with Germany as an alliance rather than a 
treaty of nonaggression. The inclination to view the Soviet Union as an enemy allied with Hitler 
led to the perception that Finland was fighting on the same side as Britain.  
The Winter War had the further appeal of offering an exciting diversion from the 
boredom of the ‘phoney war’ to a small Scandinavian nation defending itself against a great 
power.166 At a time when Britain was technically at war but little was happening, the Winter War 
caused a sensation for the international press. Foreign correspondents in Finland portrayed the 
Winter War as a battle between good and evil that captured imaginations all over the world, not 
the least in Britain.167 The Finnish underdog fought for its democracy and freedom: the 
expressed cause of the Allies, which they had not had yet the chance to fight for.168 From 
December 1, 1939 to March 16, 1940, The Times and The Manchester Guardian kept the public 










“If your country is attacked,” Lord Baldwin had assured the Finnish ambassador to 
Britain in November 1939, “there’ll be a real storm here in this country.”169 His words were 
confirmed only weeks later when British press expressed near universal outrage at the invasion 
of Finland. “All the resentment felt against the Soviet Government for the Ribbentrop-Molotov 
Pact was fanned into flame by the latest exhibition of brutal bullying and aggression,” remarked 
Churchill in his memoirs.170 The Soviet attack was decried by The Manchester Guardian on 
December 1 as “an act of entirely unprovoked aggression,” without “a shadow of an excuse.”171 
The Times called the Soviet attack “a moment of indefensible outrage.”172 This “act of naked 
territorial aggression,” ranted The Times, is “an offence that administers yet one more shock to 
the battered fabric of international morality.”173 “The friends of Finland,” The Times went on, 
“must include all the free nations of the world.”174  
The Times habitually equated the aims and crimes of Germany with the Soviet Union. 
Both were undemocratic dictatorial regimes engaged in aggressive territorial expansion. 
Although the Soviet Union was not even in a military alliance with Germany, the public tended 
to perceive it as collaborator of Germany and an enemy of Britain. The Times claimed that, “the 
mask must now seem to be finally withdrawn. Stalin, like his colleague at Berchtesgaden, 
employs the trick of representing his intended victim as a provocative mischief-maker . . . in 











partitioners of Poland seems clean and respectable.”175 “In circumstances of unprecedented 
gravity, violence, and confusion,” it stated, “two great nations are indulging in an orgy of 
predatory aggression.”176  
Even the leftist British trade union and labour movement was quick to publicize its 
allegiance to Finland and condemn Soviet aggression. The National Council of Labour issued an 
official statement to condemn the invasion, insisting that British Labour “repudiates utterly these 
claims of the Government of the U.S.S.R.” 177 In contrast to the Soviet Government’s betrayal of 
socialism, British Labour called to attention “the splendid achievements of the Finnish nation in 
social legislation and in the building up of a trade union, co-operative, and political organisation 
of the working class on the foundations of true democracy.”178 It heartily endorsed material 
support, stating that “the League Council . . . calls upon the free nations of the world to give 
every practicable aid to the Finnish nation in its struggle to preserve its own institutions of 
civilisation and democracy.”179 
The Christian churches of Great Britain, represented by the Bishop of Worcerster, the 
Archdeacon of London, the Moderator of the Church of Scotland, the Moderator of the Federal 
Council of the Evangelical Free Churches of England, and the President of the National Council 
of the Evangelical Free Churches of England issued a public statement to the Lutheran 
Archbishop of Finland expressing their sympathy for Finland’s cause. “We are filled with 









your lives, but the independence of your country.”180 The statement continued to praise Finland’s 
“brave stand” and endorsed the just cause of Finland: “We recognize that Finland is defending 
precious principles – righteousness and truth in international relations, freedom in the conduct of 
life, and the very cause of civilisation . . . we, too, are engaged in a bitter struggle for the same 
principles as yourselves.” 181 
The Soviet bombing of Finnish civilians produced further outrage and newspapers 
published dramatic reports of aerial attacks. A Sunday Times January headline read “Children 
Wear White Coats to Hide from Machine-Gunners.”182 It asked the reader to “visualize farm 
girls stumbling through the snow for the uncertain safety of their frozen cellars . . . bombs falling 
on frozen villages unprotected by a single anti-aircraft gun; men standing helplessly in front of 
blazing buildings with no apparatus with which to fight the fires, and others desperately trying to 
salvage their belongings from burning wreckage.”183 The Times also reserved special reproach 
for the indiscriminate bombing and insisted that, “it is the obvious duty of every Government 
which values the service which Finland is rendering to civilization to supply her with the 
maximum number [of combat aircraft] in the minimum of time.”184 
As the Finns demonstrated a capacity to resist, the public began to consider the broader 
implications of continued resistance. Along with general sympathy and, as Churchill recalled, 
“enthusiasm for the gallant Finns,” many concluded that continued resistance would serve 











substantial aid.185 “In spite of the Great War which had been declared,” Churchill stated in his 
memoirs, “there was a keen desire to help the Finns by aircraft and other precious war material 
and by volunteers from Britain.”186  
The British press widely began to claim that Finland was fighting for the same values as 
the Allies. The Times stated that “the assistance given to Finland by many countries, including . . 
. Great Britain, has been given because . . . Finland is defending other values besides her own – 
namely, the justice and civilization of the West.” 187 At the very least, The Sunday Times pointed 
out, Finland would serve British interests because “the Finnish war will levy some toll on 
Russia’s stocks of raw materials and finished goods,” and thereby divert valuable resources away 
from Germany.188 The Sunday Times considered the diversion of resources a “reason . . . why we 
should give Finland all the assistance that is possible,” since “the motive of Germany’s 
agreement with Russia was to insure herself against the effects of the British blockade.”189 “The 
more deeply Russia is tied up with the Finnish entanglement the less energy she will have to 
assist Germany,” continued The Sunday Times, “does it not follow that we owe to the wonderful 
resistance that the Finns are making a debt not only of admiration and of the most benevolent 
neutrality but of gratitude for the assistance that they are endering to our cause at sea? [sic]”190 
The Manchester Guardian proclaimed that only Finland was standing in the way of “a 
German-Russian ascendancy in Northern Europe that will be a direct menace to British 










supplies for Germany.”191 Dominance of Scandinavia would further enable Germany “to prepare 
for the offensive against Great Britain on a much broader basis than at present, and with far 
greater possibilities of waging more extensive naval and aerial warfare.”192 “The defeat of 
Finland would be prejudicial to the interests of this country,” it stated, because it would have “a 
distinct bearing on the further course of the wider European conflict.”193 The press increasingly 
tied Finland’s struggle to the Allies’ war with Germany, a connection that it claimed the public 
was also beginning to make. The Guardian asserted that “it is at last realised that the Finnish war 
is an offensive of the German-Russian coalition against the Western Powers . . . help will have to 
be given because the independence of Finland has become a major strategic interest and an 
important economic interest of the Western Powers.” 194  
 The British press widely endorsed aid to Finland on the basis that it was another front in 
the world war.  “Finland’s cause is our cause,” stated The Guardian, “we are concerned with the 
defence of Mannerheim’s Line as well as Maginot’s.”195 The Times also pointed out early on that 
“there is much . . . short of war that can and must be done by other countries to help Finland in 
her need. . . . only a small diversion of British and French resources should ensure their triumph 
in the air, and consequently their triumph in defence.”196 As the conflict drew to a close, the 
press overwhelmingly criticized the government’s lack of aid for Finland.  
Finland occupied the front pages all throughout the conflict. Several newspapers, 











struggle that it would cause them to forget their own war; yet it is clear that many considered the 
Finnish war to be another front in the wider European conflict.197 The public supported the 
Finnish Red Cross with gifts of money and goods and collections across Britain gathered large 
quantities of clothes, shoes, medicine and other supplies. Even Churchill demonstrated his 
support by sending his skis.198 G.A. Gripenberg, Finnish Ambassador to Britain, recalled 
generous anonymous donations, school teachers who pledged ten percent of their salaries to 
Finland – even a letter containing seventeen shillings and sixpence which read “I am only a poor 
milkmaid, and so I can’t send you more than this.”199 Finland funds were established and British 
citizens donated generously. When the House of Commons announced that British subjects 
would be free to volunteer to fight in Finland, over 2,000 applications were immediately 
received. After the Finland Aid Bureau was established to process applications, recruits averaged 
50 per day for the next two weeks.200  
Official reactions to the Soviet invasion were more reserved. London did not think 
Finland could resist more than a few days and its main concern was whether or not the conflict 
was likely to affect British interests. Neville Chamberlain stated to the War Cabinet on 
December 1 that in his opinion the invasion very likely presaged a hasty submission to Russian 
demands.201 General Edmund Ironside, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, expected that, 
although the Finns might continue guerrilla actions for some time, they would not withstand 










invasion of Finland. It concluded that as long as Russian expansion was confined to Finland, it 
would have no adverse effects on British interests, and could possibly even drive a wedge 
between the Soviet Union and Germany.203 Chamberlain wrote in his diary that “I am as 
indignant as anyone at the Russians’ behaviour, but I am bound to say that I don’t think the 
Allied cause is likely to suffer thereby.”204 
In the opinion of the War Cabinet, good relations with the Soviet Union outweighed their 
distaste for Soviet aggression against Finland. Churchill, Halifax, and Chamberlain, among 
others, believed that close ties between the Soviet Union and Germany would not last. Halifax 
explained to Gripenberg only hours before the invasion that, “Soviet Russia and Germany will 
never be able to cooperate.”205 It would be in Britain’s best interests to avoid hostilities with the 
Soviet Union at all cost because the latter would likely find itself on the side of Britain in war 
against Germany. In the first weeks of the Winter War, London was under the conflicting 
pressures of public opinion and the desire to avoid a breach with the Soviet Union. The Winter 
War was entirely inconvenient for the British government. 
Despite London’s political priorities, it could not avoid the political necessity of sending 
aid to Finland. World opinion necessitated a public stance on the Russian invasion if Britain was 
to keep its moral position intact. From a purely military point of view, there was no reason to aid 
Finland since Britain’s resources were already insufficient for its own needs and Finland was not 
expected to hold out against the Soviet Union; yet from a political point of view, Cabinet had no 







that it was in Britain’s interests to give Finland some measure of help in order to avoid moral 
embarrassment.206 Cabinet decided on December 5 that it would be “very desirable” to give 
Finland some assistance in the form of 20 Gladiator fighter planes, despite the risk of straining 
Britain’s relations with Russia.207 “The political effect of such a gesture might be very 
considerable,” suggested Chamberlain, particularly in regard to the Scandinavian neutrals, who 
currently supplied both Germany and Britain with iron ore. 208 Cabinet hoped they might be 
induced to intervene on the side of Finland.209 Since Americans were particularly outraged at the 
Russian invasion, Cabinet also concluded that aid to Finland might also be the best way to 
“produce a good moral effect on the United States” and enlist American sympathy for the Allied 
cause.210 
The situation of the British government became even more difficult after Finland’s appeal 
to the League of Nations. In Halifax’s opinion it was “unfortunate that these meetings should 
take place, since they could not produce any useful result, and would still further damage the 
League.”211 The instructions given to Richard Butler, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State 
at the Foreign Office and leader of the British delegation at Geneva, reflect the embarrassing 
situation of the British government. Since, in his own words, his chief concern was “to keep our 
moral position intact,” he was to condemn Russian aggression without reservation.212 However, 











prepared to follow the general lead if other states thought they should be imposed.213 The 
question of sanctions never actually came up and Butler was eventually forced to save face by 
voting with the other states for the expulsion of the Soviet Union from the League. Since the 
League’s resolution urgently appealed to every member to provide Finland with aid, and since 
Butler supported the resolution, it was clearly impossible to avoid further gestures of aid toward 
Finland.214 
The Winter War did not appear to offer any semblance of opportunity for the Allied 
cause until Finnish resistance materialized. Although aid was politically expedient, the War 
Ministry and other departments considered it a waste to send weapons to Finland because they 
would soon be lost.215 Military experts and the British government greeted initial victories 
throughout the first half of December with scepticism. Although the Swedish General Staff 
estimated that Finland could hold out for six months, if supplied with arms, the Foreign Office 
remained doubtful. It was only after Ironside confirmed the Swedish view that it would indeed be 
difficult for the Russians to prevail at this time of year, and after consecutive Finnish victories in 
the field, that it became clear that aid to Finland was strategically as well as politically 
expedient.216 
As long as Finland showed a capacity to resist, it was in Britain’s best interests to delay 
the Russian victory for as long as possible, while avoiding hostilities with the Soviet Union. 
Soviet expansion into the Baltic would not directly affect British interests; but Cabinet feared 









Europe and Asia. The American State Department informed the British Ambassador that early 
evidence showed that the Soviet Union wanted to settle the Finnish question quickly in order to 
obtain a free hand to interfere in the Balkans. 217 Furthermore, at this point, the real relationship 
between Germany and the Soviet Union was still subject to speculation. Thomas Snow, the 
British Minister in Helsinki suggested to Halifax that any failure of the German-Soviet 
combination may further erode their partnership.218 In his diary, Ironside expressed his opinion 
on December 25 that, “the solution rests with Finland. If we can keep Finland on her legs we 
shall certainly stop any combined advance in the Balkans.”219 Because of the unexpected 
difficulties faced by the Soviet Union in Finland, and the ever-growing drain on its resources, it 
was clear to London that as long as the conflict lasted, Russia would be unable to pursue other 
goals. A Chief of Staff report on December 31 concluded that, “such a commitment is likely to 
diminish [Russia’s] ability to threaten British interests in the Middle East.”220  
Although they had not yet engaged the Germans, Allied wisdom had determined that 
while Germany was stronger on land and in the air, the Allies were superior economically and at 
sea. Thus, the Allied staff in April 1939 developed a broad strategic policy that recognized that 
the only offensive weapon which the Allies could effectively use was economic. Economic 
pressure could be brought to bear through an external blockade and strategic bombing. Since air 
attacks were still restricted to military targets, it was necessary to concentrate on the blockade. 221 












because they lacked both the political will and military strength to pursue an offensive strategy. 
The Allies would seek to contain Germany while waiting for it to attack the Soviet Union. In the 
meantime, the Allies would take advantage of their naval superiority by enforcing the economic 
blockade on Germany. The Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) estimated that because 
Germany’s economy currently ran at an unsustainable capacity, the economic blockade would 
further weaken Germany while the Allies mobilized and grew in strength.222  
The Scandinavian countries directly affected the blockade because Sweden exported iron 
ore to Germany through Norwegian ports. Under the war trade agreements, Sweden was allowed 
to export iron ore to Germany but not exceeding prewar levels.223 The main iron field was the 
Kiruna-Gallivare district, close to the northern Finnish border. Sweden shipped ore in part from 
the ice-free port of Narvik on the Norwegian coast and in part from the Swedish port of Lulea in 
the Gulf of Bothnia, which was closed by ice throughout the winter.224 German shipping 
proceeded along the Norwegian coast under the protection of Norway’s territorial waters 
throughout the winter months and constituted a major leak in the blockade.225 
Following the outbreak of war, the MEW concluded that the main weakness of 
Germany’s economy was a shortage of labour and essential raw materials, including iron ore.226 
From 1936-1938 Sweden had provided between 52.1 and 59.1% of Germany’s total imports of 
iron ore.227 In 1938 Germany imported approximately 22 million tons of iron ore, of which 9 ½ 










German stocks of ore were likely very low and in order to avoid an industrial breakdown, 
Germany had to import a minimum of 9 million tons of ore from Sweden during the first year of 
war.228 However, no amount of pressure could induce Sweden to stop ore exports entirely. The 
Swedish government feared that if it voluntarily cut off supplies to Germany, Germany would 
invade in order to safeguard its vital supplies of iron ore.229 
The export of iron ore from Sweden to Germany was a major problem for the Allies. 
Churchill in particular had wanted to cut off Scandinavian supplies to Germany since September 
1939. At the Allied Supreme War Council in Paris on December 19, the French Premier Edouard 
Daladier brought forward new evidence in support of the MEW’s estimate. Baron Fritz Thyssen, 
a German steel magnate exiled in Switzerland, claimed that the Allies could achieve a swift 
victory by seizing the Swedish ore fields.230 The German war industry, deprived of vital supplies 
of iron ore, would soon collapse.231 Rather than simply cutting off the Narvik shipments of ore, 
which would only be effective throughout the winter months, Daladier proposed that the iron 
fields be seized in conjunction with armed intervention in Finland.232  
The Chiefs of Staff and the MEW strongly supported Daladier’s proposal. The MEW’s 
report concluded that a stoppage of Narvik traffic would curtail Germany’s supply of ore by 1 
million tons during the four winter months; but Germany would still be able to obtain the 9-10 
million tons a year essential to its war economy.233 However, if the entire exports of the 










Grangesberg deposit, which would at most yield 5 million tons a year instead of the 9 million 
that the German industry needed. The only source from which Germany could replace Swedish 
ore would be the Soviet Union; yet deliveries from the Soviet Union were not likely to exceed 1 
million tons of poor quality ore before 1941. The MEW estimated that such a closure “might 
well bring German industry to a standstill and would, in any case, have a profound effect on the 
duration of the war.”234  
Churchill argued that cutting off of Germany’s ore supplies was “worth all the rest of the 
blockade” and provided the chance to shorten the war and to avoid “immeasurable bloodshed” 
on the western front. 235 However, he suggested a plan to take immediate action against the port 
of Narvik in addition to seizing the iron ore fields. Halifax agreed that “we cannot fight this war 
on the basis of allowing Germany to break all the rules while we keep them” and enthusiastically 
supported any plan considered vital to the prosecution or shortening of the war.236 The Chiefs of 
Staff considered the military implications of the larger project of stopping all ore traffic from 
Sweden. If the Allies successfully seized the Gallivare iron fields, Germany, because of the 
desperate circumstances in which it would find itself, would undoubtedly react violently. 
According to the Chiefs of Staff, Germany would likely bomb southern Sweden in an attempt to 
coerce the Swedish government, which would in turn force Sweden onto the side of the Allies. It 
would be a great advantage to the Allies to open a Scandinavian front, away from Western 
Europe.237 If the Allies were to carry out the plan to take the Gallivare iron fields, it meant they 








succeed without the consent of Norway.238 Cabinet concluded that the Allies should give all 
possible assistance to Finland to enlist Scandinavian sympathy, and urge Sweden and Norway to 
do the same in order to further involve them in the Finnish conflict.239  
The Prime Minister was evidently enthralled with Thyssen’s memorandum and the 
chance to deal “a mortal blow to Germany,” but felt compelled to exercise caution.240 He 
suggested that the way to enlist the Scandinavians was not through their fear of Germany but 
their fear of Russia, to whom they were more vulnerable. Anti-Russian sentiments were also very 
strong in Scandinavia, while anti-German feelings were not. Therefore, the danger of Russian 
aggression should be greatly exaggerated and they should be urged to increase their assistance to 
Finland. They would probably realize that further assistance to Finland would mean an increased 
threat from Russia, and in this case the Allies could offer a guarantee of protection.241 Then, as 
the Chiefs of Staff suggested, while Finland was in danger of collapsing, the Allies would 
announce their intention to intervene. They would request passage that Norway and Sweden, out 
of sympathy to Finland, would presumably grant. Then Allied troops would secure the Gallivare 
iron fields while on route to Finland. 
The Chiefs of Staff recommended by the end of December that, despite the risks 
involved, the project for the complete stoppage of the export of Swedish iron ore to Germany 
should indeed be carried out. This plan would allow the Allies to finally seize the initiative and 
undertake offensive operations which might well prove decisive. “The opportunity is a great 








to us elsewhere.”242 They also warned that if their recommendation was accepted, halfway 
measures would not suffice: Scandinavia would have to be regarded, for the time being, as the 
decisive theatre of war. Other than security at home and in France, all else would have to be 
relegated to second place.243 
The Chiefs of Staff concluded that Scandinavian cooperation was absolutely essential to 
the success of the operation. The entire report rested on the assumption that the Scandinavians 
would readily cooperate. A military expedition inland from Narvik in the face of either 
Norwegian or Swedish opposition was simply “not a feasible operation.”244 It was likely to 
succeed as long as the Allies had Scandinavian cooperation and acted fast enough to secure the 
key positions before the Germans or the Russians.  
The Chiefs of Staff believed that Allied operations in northern Sweden would provoke a 
German attack on southern Norway.245 There was also the possibility that intervention in 
Scandinavia might lead to hostilities with Russia; yet the Chiefs of Staff concluded that, “the 
risks involved . . . are small compared with the opportunity now offered of achieving the early 
defeat of Germany.”246 Despite the Chiefs of Staff’s recommendations, Cabinet remained 
divided over the details of the operations and they re-invited the Chiefs of Staff to reconsider the 
implications of Germany seizing bases in southern Norway.  
On January 4, the Swedish Minister handed Halifax a memorandum containing the 









the offer of assurances.247 Sweden avoided any reference to Allied assurances and only stated 
that, in their opinion, the best way to help Finland was by “maintaining with firmness that policy 
of neutrality which the Swedish Government declared on the outbreak of war on the 1st 
September 1939.”248 Cabinet decided that in order to hearten the Swedes, every effort must be 
made to support Finland. If the Allies could prevent a Finnish collapse, Sweden would see that 
the Allies could provide real help if Sweden was threatened by Germany or Russia. In due time, 
helping Finland might encourage the Scandinavians to rely on the offer of Allied assurances.249 
However, Sweden was reluctant to cooperate because it feared becoming involved in the broader 
war. Swedish newspapers throughout January suggested that the Allies were trying to create a 
Scandinavian front and manipulate Sweden into entering the war against its will.250 These 
observations made the Swedes and Norwegians increasingly wary of the political dangers 
associated with helping the Finns.251 Although the Scandinavians had not accepted the Allied 
offer of assurances, plans for intervention continued to proceed upon the assumption that 
Scandinavian cooperation would be forthcoming.  
British policy throughout January was characterized by indecision and lack of leadership. 
Ironside confided in his diary that in Cabinet “we do talk a lot of nonsense these days. . . .What a 
curious thing it is that we have no more strategic ideas than building up an enormous army in 
France, protecting England, and waiting to see what the Germans are going to do.”252 However, 











defeat. When the threat from Russia became intensified, “no doubt Sweden would be very ready 
to ask for our aid.”253 In the meantime, Cabinet’s only policy was to continue to aid Finland and 
to use the threat of action against Narvik to pressure the Scandinavians to involve themselves 
further in Finland’s cause. 
On January 18, Halifax received a dispatch from British Minister Thomas Snow that the 
whole of Finland’s available manpower had already been used. Field-Marshal Carl Mannerheim 
estimated that based on current resources Finland could not hold out for more than a short 
time.254 Liaison officer Brigadier Ling, after spending two weeks at Mannerheim’s headquarters 
gave a pessimistic report on the realities of the situation in Finland. Mannerheim told him he 
needed at least 30,000 fresh soldiers before the winter was over if Finland was to last into the 
spring.255 Meanwhile, public opinion in Britain was increasingly in favour of helping Finland by 
every possible means and London was under considerable pressure to do more for the Finns.256 
The dual weight of Ling’s report and public opinion forced Cabinet to intensify assistance to 
Finland. If Finland fell it would be disastrous for Britain’s plans to occupy the Gallivare iron 
fields. For the first time, Cabinet began to seriously consider including a component of the 
expeditionary force solely intended to support Finland.257  
The French government was far more willing to accept involvement in the Finnish war. 
On January 18 the French Ambassador Charles Corbin handed Halifax an aide-mémoire which 
complained of the absence of any positive decision to take action against the Narvik traffic. It 









of Narvik traffic might provoke a German reprisal which would then give the Allies an 
opportunity to land an expeditionary force and occupy the iron fields. The French were also in 
favour of directly assisting Finland. On January 22 the French government suggested aid to 
Finland not only in the form of material but through military intervention. The French proposed 
that the Allies oversee a Polish attack on the Soviet-occupied Finnish port of Petsamo. The Poles 
could land troops that were presently stationed in France. The Allied expeditionary force could 
then be landed either at Narvik, if Norway agreed, or at Petsamo if Norway refused.258 If Norway 
refused, a French brigade of Chasseurs Alpins, two Foreign Legion battalions, four Polish 
battalions, and one or two British brigades could combine operations with the Finns to take 
Petsamo.259  
 The Chiefs of Staff rejected the French proposals out of hand. The Petsamo project was a 
difficult operation and it was likely to involve the Allies in hostilities with the Soviet Union. In 
addition, it would probably not afford any decisive measure of assistance to the Finns and would 
bring the Allies no closer to securing the Gallivare iron fields.260 Daladier expounded on the 
Petsamo project at the Supreme War Council meeting on February 5 and emphasized that if the 
British turned it down, something else must be done immediately to help the Finns. Daladier’s 
sense of urgency was related to French domestic politics. Unlike Chamberlain, Daladier had a 
strong anti-Soviet pressure group against him and was more inclined to accept hostilities with the 
Soviet Union. Morale in France was low, the French grew restless with the general lack of 
operations, and public opinion was highly sympathetic to the Finns. Daladier had been Prime 







political intrigues on the part of those who wished to see a change in office. Daladier wished to 
capitalize on pro-Finnish sentiments and increase his popularity in France by doing something to 
help the Finns.261 
Evidently both Allied governments were under considerable political pressure to do more 
for Finland and Ling’s reports highlighted Finland’s urgent need for men and material. At the 
Supreme War Council in February, both Daladier and Chamberlain agreed that public and world 
opinion made it imperative to sustain Finland. Finland’s collapse would be a severe blow to 
morale in Britain and France and would be seen throughout the world as a setback for the Allies 
because of the public perception that the Finns fought for the Allied cause.262 It would likely 
have very serious political consequences for both leaders. On February 2 the War Cabinet 
stumbled upon a new policy that combined aid to Finland with the plan to occupy Gallivare. 
Until that point British policy planed to gain control over Swedish ore by offering to protect 
Sweden and Norway from a Russian or German attack following, or near, the collapse of 
Finland. Now Cabinet realized that the same goal could be achieved under the pretext of aiding 
Finland through the Narvik-Lulea railway. British efforts thus far to threaten and offer 
assurances to the Scandinavians had failed and there was nothing to lose by pursuing the same 
objective by other means.263  
Chamberlain explained to Daladier the British plans for the dispatch of three divisions to 







Germans to act.264 The Allies would immediately make full preparation for the expedition. In the 
meantime, it would be arranged for Finland to issue an appeal to the world for assistance when 
the Allies were ready to embark. Finland would address Norway and Sweden in particular, its 
nearest neighbours and most likely the next victim of Russian expansion. The Allies would then 
approach the Scandinavians and publically request passage across their territories in order to 
answer Finland’s appeal for aid. Global sympathy for Finland would place enormous pressure on 
the Scandinavians to grant passage to the Allies. Allied forces would then land at Narvik and 
Trondheim and move up to Finland through Boden, above the Gulf of Bothnia in northern 
Sweden. This route would bring the Allies within very close vicinity to Gallivare, where troops 
could secure the iron fields. All of these plans were extremely time-sensitive if the first 
contingent of troops was to be ready to arrive in Scandinavia in order to forestall the Germans.265 
On February 16 the Chiefs of Staff updated the War Cabinet on the progress of the 
expeditionary preparation. Given the limitations of transport and loading, the earliest date on 
which the expeditionary force could disembark in Norway would be March 20, which meant that 
the process of loading store ships would have to begin by March 1 and the decision to dispatch 
the force would have to be made by March 11 at the latest. If the expeditionary force was to 
provide any useful assistance to the Finns it would have to arrive in Norway no later than April 
3, which meant that the War Cabinet would have to decide before March 25.266 
Despite the many serious risks involved the Chiefs of Staff considered the pay-off well 







War Cabinet minutes concluded, “and we had to find some pretext for getting a footing in 
Scandinavia in order to secure these fields.”267 Even in the worst possible situation – if Sweden 
did not resist a German invasion and refused to invite Allied assistance – Churchill was 
determined that Allied troops should still try to force their way into the northern iron fields.268 
Throughout the planning stages of the operation, the War Cabinet had assumed that 
Finland would willingly cooperate, and would welcome assistance. Meanwhile, unknown to 
London, Moscow for the first time became willing to negotiate. On January 29 Alexandra 
Kollontai, the Soviet Minister in Stockholm, communicated to Helsinki through Sweden that the 
Soviet government was not opposed in principle to a settlement, although the demands would be 
significantly harsher than they had been prior to the war. Stalin did not want to become involved 
in the great power war. Since Moscow became aware of possible Allied intervention as early as 
the beginning of January, it is likely that the Soviet government wished to conclude the war 
before the western powers could intervene, in order to avoid hostilities with Britain and France. 
The Soviets planned a new offensive in February to apply heavy military pressure while opening 
negotiations.269  
By February 12 Moscow informed Helsinki of its demands: annexation of the whole of 
the Karelian Isthmus, an area north of Ladoga, and also the lease of the Hanko Peninsula where 
the Soviets sought to build a naval base. If the Finns rejected the terms the Soviets would 
continue their onslaught while raising the demands of the peace terms. For the Finns there was 







assistance from Sweden for a second time on February 13. The only ideas Helsinki had of Allied 
intervention plans came from ambiguous and unpromising reports from Paris and London. 270 
By mid-February, London realized that the Finns might not be as willing to cooperate 
with the Allies as the War Cabinet had assumed. Finnish collusion was necessary to make an 
international appeal; but since the Russian offensive was already breaking Finnish defences and 
Allied intervention would involve Finland in hostilities with Germany, it was possible that 
limited assistance from the Allies might not be worth the risk of becoming trapped between two 
great powers.271 At this time Britain had also received reports that Germany and the United 
States considered mediating an end to the conflict. It was in British interests for Finland to fight 
as long as possible so the western powers could secure their objective in Gallivare.272 
These anxieties caused indecision in London over when Finland should be informed of 
Allied intentions. There was doubt that Sweden would accede to the request for passage unless 
Finland was on the verge of collapse. There was also small chance of Sweden granting passage 
unless it was sure that Allied aid was substantial, in which case it would be desirable to hold staff 
meetings with Sweden as soon as possible; yet if Sweden was aware of Allied intentions, it 
would undoubtedly pressure Finland not to accept the offer of intervention and no doubt leak 
information to Germany since their military advisors were in constant touch with the German 
army.273 Cabinet decided that the request for passage should be made immediately after the 
Finnish appeal and that the Allied force be as large as possible274. It was imperative that the 









having or the Swedes would likely reject it. A large force was also necessary to defend southern 
Sweden and hopefully even deter a German invasion.275 Therefore, Cabinet decided that the 
Finns should be informed when in crisis, but with enough time for them to make a decision and 
not so much time so that the plans were leaked out to the Germans. 
On February 18, Cabinet agreed to communicate the Allies’ intervention plans to 
Mannerheim through Brigadier Ling, but not to inform the Finnish government officially. Ling 
was scheduled to arrive in Finland on February 19. The Allied force that was to be sent solely to 
Finland would initially number about two brigades, due to transport limitations, but would 
eventually rise to a total of three brigades. Because of maintenance difficulties the Allied forces 
would not be permitted to operate below the “waist line” in southern Finland, although it was 
there – at the Mannerheim Line – that the Finns most needed reinforcements. Cabinet worried 
that Mannerheim might not consider the acceptance of Allied forces worthwhile. Only 
substantial aid would be worth hostilities with Germany. Furthermore, Sweden would probably 
cease aiding Finland if Mannerheim accepted Allied intervention because Sweden’s armaments 
were currently being resupplied by Germany, who would undoubtedly stop supplying Sweden if 
Finland aligned itself with the Allies. On the other hand, Cabinet expected that Mannerheim 
might try to use the threat of Allied intervention to squeeze more aid out of Sweden and as a 
lever in negotiations with the Soviet Union.276  
Despite these misgivings, Cabinet went ahead with the plan and hoped for the best. 
Cabinet trusted that Mannerheim would see more than numbers, although the Allied assistance 






and that it might have a “very great” moral effect on the war. Brigadier Ling could also point out 
that the size of the intervention force was reduced by the transport limitations, which 
Mannerheim new full well, and assure Mannerheim that the “whole strength” of the Allies would 
be forthcoming.277  
Ling was instructed to inform Mannerheim that the British and French governments were 
preparing an intervention force that would be ready around the middle of March. He was to 
assure Mannerheim that Sweden and Norway would yield to a public appeal, so long as the 
timing of the appeal was closely coordinated with the date on which the Allies would be ready to 
intervene. To prevent Sweden from pressuring Finland to accept an early peace or Mannerheim 
from using the threat of intervention as a bargaining device, Cabinet’s instructions to Ling stated 
that “you are to impress on him the importance to Finland that this project should not be 
prejudiced by . . . acceptance of invitations from any neutral powers to accept mediation for an 
early peace.”278 Lest Finland pursue peace, Ling was to point out that “the Allied intervention 
would give the Finns a chance of beating the Russians rather than having to accept unfavourable 
terms of peace.”279 Despite London’s insistence, the policy it tried to persuade the Finns to 
follow was suicidal. It served only British interests for Finland to continue the war on the 
promise of such a meagre British commitment.  
By the end of February, Finland was faced with three options: the initiation of peace 
negotiations, the possibility of military assistance from Sweden, and the aid offered by Britain 







Allied offer of assistance. He feared it would influence opinion against pursuing peace. 280  
Mannerheim also expressed apprehension about western aid. According to Tanner, Ling did not 
give sufficiently detailed or exact reports and he did not think that Sweden and Norway would 
agree to grant transit rights. He stated in a memorandum that “in the opinion of the defense 
council, the inadequately prepared aid of the Allies should be assigned last place.”281 It was not 
in Finland’s interest to be drawn into the war between the great powers for promises of limited 
aid. Mannerheim knew full well that if Finland became involved in a war with both Germany 
and the Soviet Union, Britain would not be able to offer much assistance and the transport 
facilities would likely be unavailable.282 He recommended that if the Finnish government should 
consider making an appeal for aid, the Finnish military command should first request the details 
of the exact amount, time and the manner in which intervention would be carried out.283 
On February 24, Brigadier Ling, with British envoy Gordon Vereker, officially 
introduced the intervention plan to the Finnish government. They promised an expeditionary 
force of 20,000 men to Finland with twice the normal firing capacity to be ready to leave on 
March 15 and arrive in Finland a month later. On Mannerheim’s suggestion, the Finnish 
government tried to use the threat of intervention as a lever to pursue its other options: to get 
easier peace terms from the Soviet Union and military aid from Sweden. Although Molotov told 
Helsinki that western aid would probably never materialize, the Soviet government cautiously 










asked the Foreign Office to transmit the conditions of peace to Finland, although they were 
already known by the Finnish government. The Ambassador ominously warned that a refusal to 
do so might have an unexpected influence on their countries’ relations.285 Halifax refused and 
stated that the Foreign Office considered the terms unacceptable. Britain had no wish for Finland 
to pursue peace; yet rather than have the Finns find out after the war that Britain had withheld 
peace terms from them, Cabinet decided to tell Finland about the demarche but not to 
communicate the terms.286 
In the meantime, the Foreign Office avoided releasing details of the planned intervention 
to the Finnish government. To Gripenberg, Halifax would only note that the implementation 
would depend upon “the general situation” and the position taken by Norway and Sweden. 
Cabinet authorized only vague replies to Finnish questions of the details of the intervention, and 
if Britain would guarantee Finland’s territorial integrity. On February 26, Cabinet agreed to 
notify Finland that, “whereas it was impossible to guarantee anything, the Finnish Government 
could be sure that, if our two countries were both in the war together as Allies, we should do 
everything in our power to maintain the integrity of Finland, and that the whole resources of the 
British Empire would be exerted in the common struggle.”287 Gripenberg shared the 
apprehension of the Finnish government for the Allied proposal. Finland desperately needed 
external assistance but it was possible that Allied intervention would put Finland in an even 
worse position in the long term. If Finland became a major theatre of war, it faced the possibility 
that the Allies, who up to this point had demonstrated only timidity and indecision, would not 







ulterior motives for helping Finland, regardless of their expressed opinion that a Finnish defeat 
would be catastrophic for the principles they were fighting to preserve.  
Mannerheim strongly recommended that Finland conclude peace with the Soviet Union 
while it still had an army and the threat of intervention to play as a trump card. If either of these 
advantages were lost by continuing the war, the possibility of attaining an acceptable peace 
would be significantly reduced; but first, the Finnish Cabinet preferred to assess the details of the 
intervention and determine whether the Allies could even get through to Finland across Norway 
and Sweden.288 In a visit to Stockholm on February 27, Tanner tentatively asked about the 
possibility of Allied transit. He was told to expect no military aid, that Sweden would refuse to 
grant transit rights, and that if the Allies were to attempt passage without permission, Sweden 
would end up at war with both Finland and the Allies on the side of the Russians.289 
On February 28, only a few hours before the Soviets delivered a peace ultimatum, the 
War Office corrected the statement made by Vereker and Ling. The Allies would not send 
20,000 troops; rather, only 12,000-13,000 could be expected, and they would not reach Finland 
until the end of April. At the same time, both London and Paris put pressure on Finland not to 
accept the Soviet ultimatum.  The French government communicated to Finland that if they 
accepted peace, the French would no longer offer assistance and would consider Finland as 
having moved over to the German side.290 Daladier instructed the French envoy to exaggerate the 
size of the expeditionary force in order to force the Finns to ask for help, even though the French 







50,000 men in Finland by the end of March to serve under Mannerheim in any area of Finland.291 
Daladier also pressured Britain to do more, saying that he would be forced to resign if the Allies 
could not intervene. Ironside wrote with disgust in his diary on March 11 that “they [the French] 
are absolutely unscrupulous in everything.”292  
By March 1, the Finnish government felt that it had 24 hours to make a decision and 
wanted definite guarantees that Allied assistance would be substantial, arrive on time, and reach 
Finland regardless of Scandinavian attitudes.293 Helsinki informed London that in order to make 
a decision, the Finnish government would have to know if the Allies could immediately dispatch 
100 bombers. The British answer soon made it clear that they did not have 100 bombers to spare, 
which raised doubts about the capacity of the Allies to provide effective assistance. Halifax 
spoke in vague terms and gave misleading information to Gripenberg. He claimed that 50,000 
troops could be sent over the period of two weeks and up to 13,000 could be in Finland by the 
end of March. When Gripenberg asked if the troops would be placed under Mannerheim’s 
command and allowed to operate in southern Finland, he replied ambiguously that the troops 
would be used wherever they were needed and “there is no British soldier who would not gladly 
serve under such a great soldier” as Field-Marshal Mannerheim.294 In regards to the question of 
what the Allies would do if the Scandinavians refused to grant transit rights, Halifax stated non-








upon the governments in Oslo and Stockholm. Even if they refuse, it does not necessarily mean 
that the Allies will abandon their plans to come to Finland’s assistance.”295 
Even by March 4, London continued to give contradictory and unclear answers. The 
British government tried to pressure Finland to reject peace negotiations and continue fighting. 
Britain refused to release any bombers to Finland until it publically appealed for aid. The 
Defence Minister urged Finland not to begin negotiations and pointed out that if they sent 
bombers and Finland concluded peace, the British bombers would be wasted. If, however, a new 
Allied front was created in Finland, then Britain would naturally pour all its resources into the 
area. Despite London’s best efforts to blackmail Finland, the dilemma for the Finns was that it 
could not continue fighting without bombers, and it would be foolish to appeal for help without a 
concrete guarantee that the Allies would provide substantial assistance. The Swedes in the 
meantime were desperate for Finland to conclude peace on any terms in order to keep the great 
power war out of Scandinavia.  
By March 6, the Finnish government established contact with the Soviet government. 
Since Finnish interest in intervention plans was quickly fading, Finland would be willing to 
conclude peace if the terms were acceptable. If the demands were unacceptable, Finland would 
fight on. The Finnish government instructed Gripenberg to ask if the proposed appeal to the 
Allies could be made as late as March 12, so that the Finns could hear the terms and deliberate 
the wisest course of action. In a meeting with Halifax on March 7, Gripenberg explained the 
difficult situation of the Finnish government. The British government finally agreed to release 50 





planes might have the psychological impact necessary to convince the Finnish government to 
make the appeal.296 
Two days later the British government revealed the planes would only be released on 
condition. The Foreign Office notified Helsinki that the British government had learned that the 
Finns were conducting peace negotiations with the Soviets. London issued an ultimatum: if the 
negotiations led to peace, Britain would have no objections; but if they did not, the British 
government would release the 50 Blenheim bombers. Eight bombers were ready to be flown to 
Finland four days after the Finnish government had appealed to the Allies for military aid. The 
remaining 42 would be sent within the next ten days. The Allies were willing to send an 
expeditionary force to Finland as long as a request was made by March 12.297 They failed to 
appreciate the time pressure of the Finnish military condition. By February 16 the Red Army had 
broken through the first and major defence of the Mannerheim line and the second defence by 
February 29. By March 6 the Red Army had crossed the Finnish Gulf, cutting off Viipuri and the 
Finnish forces on the Karelian Peninsula. Given the urgency of Finland’s situation, the British 
reply only demonstrated that they did not have the capacity to provide the aid Finland needed. 
The Finns were unconvinced that the Allies really intended to help or were even able to do so. 
The Finnish government gradually lost interest in Allied intervention. According to Gripenberg, 
after the British government communicated its ultimatum, “Finland’s fate had been sealed.”298 
The War Cabinet appreciated the difficulty of the Finnish situation and on March 11 even 







stated in the House of Commons that the Allies “are prepared, in response to an appeal from 
them for further aid, to proceed immediately and jointly to the help of Finland, using all available 
resources at their disposal.”299 The statement did not contain any reference to the condition that 
the Scandinavians grant passage. Therefore, if the Finns asked for assistance, a Scandinavian 
refusal would present a potentially embarrassing situation; yet it would have appeared weak to 
publically state that Allied action depended on Scandinavian permission. In light of this problem, 
Chamberlain thought that if the Finns appealed it would be “fatal” to abandon the expedition 
simply because of a diplomatic refusal from the Scandinavians. “It would be said that we had 
never meant business at all,” he predicted, “and that our offer of assistance had been a mere 
sham.”300 It is evident that, given the possible domestic repercussions that would follow inaction, 
Chamberlain was committed to carry out the intervention plans even in the face of limited 
Scandinavian resistance if the Finns appealed. 
Churchill concurred. He believed that the Norwegians would not seriously oppose a 
landing if Britain tried to force its way in. The expedition leader could go ashore and inform the 
authorities of the Allies’ intention to land while in the meantime the troops could disembark. If 
the troops were opposed and the railways disabled, Britain would still be in possession of a 
useful harbour and could continue to try to persuade the Scandinavians to let the troops advance 
further; but in all likelihood, Churchill maintained, “it would be a matter for persuasion and 






they could not land, the blow to their prestige would be small compared a scenario where Britain 
abandoned the expedition altogether.301 
Ironside agreed that the troops could easily disembark while the commander in charge 
argued with the port authorities. He suggested that Cabinet should leave it up to the commander 
to judge whether the opposition was serious enough to justify abandoning the project. The first 
move after embarking would be to seize the railway station and try to immediately move the 
troops up to the Swedish border. A simultaneous landing would be made at Trondheim, quite far 
from Finland, where the troops could immediately proceed since the port had easy access to 
roads, unlike Narvik. The expeditionary force was unlikely to meet with opposition if it used the 
element of surprise to disembark and take position while the Norwegians decided what action to 
take.302 “I can see our big Scots Guards shouldering the sleepy Norwegians out of the way at 5 
a.m. in the morning,” Ironside commented in his diary, “It seems inconceivable that the 
Norwegians should put up any resistance if they are in any way surprised.”303 
Although in the end London finally decided to take action to aid Finland, the Finns 
concluded peace before British plans could unfold. The Finnish war offered the Allies a chance 
not only to take the initiative but to turn the tide of the war; yet the Chamberlain government 
failed to act in a timely manner even though reports from Finland made it clear that the window 
of opportunity was narrow. The War Cabinet never carried out its risky plans because of 
indecision, timidity, and hesitancy to act: characteristics the Chamberlain government 







endless debate and lack of direction in Cabinet. Ironside made the frustrated observation in his 
diary that “Our War Cabinet is quite incapable of running any strategy. None of them, except 
Winston, know anything about even elementary strategy. They are dilatory and will not take a 
decision. . . . I suppose it is the Prime Minister who is so unmilitary which is at the bottom of it 
all.”304 On March 12 he complained that “Cabinet presented the picture of a bewildered flock of 
sheep faced by a problem they have consistently refused to consider. Their favourite formula is 
that the case is hypothetical and then they shy off a decision. I came away disgusted with them 
all.”305 
British assistance was too little and too late. London realized the importance of 
impressing Sweden with the size and strength of the force intended for southern Sweden; yet 
Cabinet made the mistake of assuming that Finnish cooperation would be forthcoming no matter 
the size of the expeditionary force. When Finland was in crisis, Allied troops were too far off and 
their numbers too small to tempt Finland to accept Allied intervention. In the end the Finns were 
unnerved by Allied intervention because it promised to plunge Scandinavia into world war, in 
which the prospect of receiving sufficient external aid would be unlikely.  
Though the world sympathized with Finland, and the western democracies were a major 
source of aid, it is clear that major differences in motivation existed between the democracies of 
the west. The United States, the most powerful neutral, had no strategic considerations at stake in 
Scandinavia. American aid was thus based entirely on sentiment. US aid did not amount to 
much, but pro-Finnish sentiments carried through until the end of the Second World War. British 






They tended to view the Finnish war through the framework of the war with Germany. In 
contrast to American aid, British aid was motivated by political expediency and geopolitical 
considerations rather than sentiment. Token aid to Finland was unavoidable for London. The 
British public considered Finland to be an ally fighting for a common cause and the League of 
Nations mandate endorsed all free nations to send as much aid as possible. London could barely 
spare the resources but to ignore the conflict would have damaged morale at home and angered 
the sympathetic neutrals. As Britain sunk resources into Finland and the Finns held back the 
Russians, it became imperative to sustain Finland for the sake of Allied morale; public opinion 
would have seen a Finnish collapse as a major Allied defeat.  
Above all, the most important reason for aid was the chance for a strategic initiative that 
the Finnish war offered the Allies in their war with Germany. Clearly this opportunity was the 
major goal. Aid to Finland was simply a pretext for the Allies to gain a strategic advantage over 
Germany. In the British plan to bring the war to Scandinavia, London attempted to exploit the 
neutrals in the national interests of Britain; and by pressuring Finland to reject the peace terms 
and continue fighting into March, the Allies intended to sacrifice Finland in order to gain a 
foothold in Scandinavia. However, as Gripenberg noted in his memoirs, “It was natural for the 
allied governments to look at the war in Finland primarily against the background of their own 
efforts to defeat Germany.”306 Mannerheim likewise admitted that “Finland had no reason to take 





threat of intervention as a bargaining tool with Russia.307 Sympathies aside, Britain and France 




















Chapter 3:  
The Aftermath of the Winter War 
London’s tentative planning and hesitancy could not keep up to the pace of the Winter 
War. Britain’s inability to reach a decision or offer serious aid to Finland disappointed the 
Scandinavian countries. After Finland concluded peace with the Soviet Union it thus outlived its 
usefulness to British war strategy. Britain discontinued trade with Finland, which forced Helsinki 
to reorient its economic policies to favour Germany. Furthermore, though the intervention plans 
were not timely enough or of sufficient strength to be of use to the Finns, London’s designs did 
expose Norway to attack because it threatened German vital interests in Scandinavia. 
Inconceivably, British intelligence then failed to detect Germany’s preparations for the invasion 
of Norway and Denmark. In the battle for Norway that followed, Britain proceeded to 
demonstrate military inadequacy, lack of imagination, and poor organization, though it had naval 
superiority and its invasion force had greater numbers. Instead of gaining a foothold in Norway 
and completing the economic blockade of Germany, Britain left Norway in the lurch, unable to 
provide them more than a thousand rifles.308 The geopolitical shift left Finland caught between 
the great powers of Germany and the Soviet Union. After the Allied debacle in Norway, 
Finland’s fate depended on future developments between Germany and the Soviet Union. 
Traditionally, Finland was oriented toward the western democracies. Only months before 
reaching peace with Moscow it had firmly rejected German support. Although pro-German 
circles existed, especially within the military and upper ranks of Finnish society, the largest 





Movement and its successor, the IKL, were unpopular. Helsinki had a record of opposition to 
Hitler and the Nazi regime, especially after the Molotov-Rippentrop pact. Prime Minister Risto 
Ryti was a well-known anglophile and Foreign Minister Vaino Tanner was notoriously anti-
German.309 Since its independence, Finland’s defensive plans had been based upon the 
assumption that it could delay an aggressor state until external assistance could help defeat it, 
which Helsinki assumed would be the western democracies. The main potential danger was 
always the Soviet Union.310 The Winter War shattered those illusions. In the first months of the 
war, Finland was left to fight on its own with only token gestures of aid from the Allies. Towards 
the end of the war the Allies demonstrated that they would assist Finland only so far as it would 
further their own interests.    
Despite disappointment with the Allies, the feeling pervaded in Finland that Germany 
had sold them out to the Soviet Union in 1939. The indifference of the German press to the fate 
of Finland led Finns to resent Germany, and public opinion in Finland regarded Germany as an 
enemy: an ally of the Soviet Union.311 The British minister in Helsinki claimed that “hatred of 
Germany” dominated Finnish sentiments.312 Gripenberg reassured London in March 1940 that 
there were many reasons for the Finnish nation to dislike the Germans; and in regard to the 
German treatment of Finland in the Winter War the Finns “would never forgive the Germans.”313 
Likewise the Finnish government and military command deeply resented Germany’s position in 










offensive on the Karelian Isthmus because the Soviet tactics corresponded to German drill 
patterns. In February, the Finns shot down a pilot without papers and with a German insignia in 
his breast pocket; in another instance, all that was found on a pilot were German cigarettes from 
a factory in Munich. Although his assumptions were false, Mannerheim took these anomalies as 
“concrete instances” that pointed to an even higher level of Soviet-German coordination than 
originally believed.314   
In a meeting of the German Economic Policy Department in March 1940, the German 
Foreign Minister to Helsinki confirmed that the feelings of the Finnish government toward 
Germany were “decidedly unfriendly.” According to the Foreign Minister, Helsinki still pinned 
its hopes, as in the past, on the western powers. Finland would need to rely heavily on trading 
partners for its reconstruction. Though Germany wished to expand its economic relations with 
Finland, it expected that Britain would gladly strengthen its ties with Scandinavia by increasing 
its trade with Finland. The Germans believed that Finland would reject their proposals to expand 
their economic relationship in favour of increased trade with Britain.315  
Finland did not expect or invite assistance from Germany. Even after the Allies failed to 
provide meaningful assistance in the Winter War, Finland continued to look to the democracies 
for arms and material support. In Finland’s pre-war trading economy, Britain was its principle 
partner, taking most of its exports and supplying the bulk of Finnish imports.316 Helsinki 
believed that an Allied victory would inevitably restore its lost frontiers and remove the threat of 









a war trade agreement with Britain. Under the agreement, Britain would protect Finnish maritime 
trade, while Finland would limit its trade with Germany.317 This agreement shows Finland’s 
willingness to politically bind itself to the Allies. While Finland concluded the war trade 
agreement with Britain, Finnish-German trade remained virtually at a standstill.318 
Finland desperately needed strong external economic support for reconstruction and to 
rebuild its defensive capabilities. The cessation of territory to the Soviet Union involved the 
immediate evacuation of 450,000 people into the new Finnish frontiers and the loss of some of 
Finland’s best forests. Soviet air raids had destroyed hundreds of civilian houses and inflicted 
serious industrial damage. British Foreign Minister Vereker reported from Helsinki that 
“economic and social problems confronting the Finnish Government . . . are appalling in their 
magnitude” and pleaded with London to offer assistance.319 Furthermore, despite the Moscow 
Peace Treaty, Helsinki remained suspicious of Moscow’s encroachment on Finnish 
independence and set about re-establishing defensive lines. Security remained Finland’s priority 
after the Winter War because Helsinki was even less inclined to trust the Soviet Union than it 
was before. The British legation in Helsinki reported in March 1940 that Finland feared that at 
any time it might once again be forced into a defensive war. The Finnish government believed 
that the Soviet Union’s foreign policy was driven by territorial ambitions that stretched as far as 
the Atlantic, and that only the threat of Allied intervention won them peace.320 In reality 
however, the Soviet goals were limited: Stalin sought to restore the territory of the Russian 








communicated to London that Helsinki considered the peace treaty no more than an “armed 
truce” since the Soviet Union did not achieve its war aims. At any moment the Finns might have 
to renew the struggle.321 
The United States continued to aid Finland after the peace treaty, but its aid was 
ineffective in light of Finland’s tremendous need. The United States was simply too far removed 
geographically to do Finland any practical good as a trading partner. The Export-Import Bank’s 
loan of 20,000,000 was still in effect and since Finland resumed its neutral status after the peace 
treaty the United States allowed it to purchase surplus stock from U.S. arsenals.322  
 Unfortunately for Finland, London did not reciprocate Helsinki’s desire to expand the 
Anglo-Finnish relationship. After the Moscow Peace Treaty, Finnish importance in British 
policy rapidly shrank to pre-war proportions.323 If Finland had been disappointed with Britain’s 
inability to supply arms and material in the Winter War, it was to be far more disappointed by 
the lack of British support after the peace. Even before the German occupation of Norway, 
Britain abandoned Finland despite clear warnings that if it left Finland isolated the Finns might 
very well have to turn to Germany for support. Only days after the peace treaty, the British 
commercial secretary in Helsinki, E.R. Lingeman, reported that the Finnish economy would have 
to lean increasingly on the Germans “in spite of hatred for Germany” if the Allies did not support 
it after the peace. He warned London that the Finnish attitude toward Germany would be dictated 








had closed the British market to Finland, Britain could not expect Finland to keep the status quo 
in its relationship with Germany.325  
After the conclusion of peace, London immediately forbade the delivery of war material 
to Finland. The Foreign Office asked that not only the goods en route to Finland but also the 
goods already delivered to Finland be returned.326 The Finnish legation in London protested 
vigorously since the goods had already been purchased and were now legally the property of the 
Finnish government.327 Under the arrangements, the material technically became the property of 
Finland at the port of loading.328 Britain eventually decided to drop its demand for material 
already in Finland to be returned, but only after the German invasion of Norway closed shipping 
routes. At least four ships destined for Finland were unloaded in Allied ports.329 
Now that Finland could no longer be used as a stepping stone to Scandinavia, London 
turned its attention to Norway and Sweden in an attempt to keep the plans for Narvik alive by 
offering British protection to the Scandinavians against Russia.330 “Our real objective was, of 
course, to secure possession of the Galivare ore fields,” confirmed Churchill to Cabinet on 
March 14. “Up till now we had had assistance to Finland as ‘cover’ for such a move on our 
part.”331 As far as Churchill was concerned, Britain’s only interest now in Scandinavia was to 
exploit the threat of continued Russian aggression to manipulate Norway and Sweden. The 











would be foolish to supply her with any further equipment. . . . We should be receiving heavy 
demands from Norway, which we should rather meet.”332  
The German High Command would have preferred to keep the status quo in Scandinavia. 
Scandinavian neutrality was advantageous to Germany because it maintained essential ore traffic 
without overextending German resources. In September 1939 the British Chiefs of Staff felt that 
“it seems unlikely that Germany will initiate any attack on Norway except by way of reprisal and 
even then only if Norwegian neutrality were to assume such a degree of benevolence towards the 
Allies as to interfere with iron ore supplies.”333 What could not be permitted, however, was the 
occupation of Norway by Britain, which Germany was prepared to prevent at all costs.334 British 
plans to close off Swedish ore to Germany clearly jeopardized German interests enough to 
provoke decisive action, but London’s incompetence, hesitancy, and halfway measures virtually 
guaranteed that it would be impotent to prevent a German invasion of Scandinavia. London’s 
provocative behavior and unwillingness to commit was a dangerous combination that proved 
fatal for Scandinavia. German intelligence was aware that the Winter War and the League of 
Nations’ resolution gave the Allies an ideal pretext to disrupt ore traffic from Scandinavia. By 
opening Norway to attack, British war policy indirectly led to the geopolitical isolation of 








Moved by apprehension over British designs, Hitler ordered initial planning to commence 
for the invasion of Norway in December 1939.335 On February 15, 1940 the Royal Navy boarded 
the Altmark, a German supply ship known to be carrying British prisoners, in Norwegian 
territorial waters. The Germans reasoned that if the British were prepared to violate Norwegian 
neutrality to rescue a few hundred prisoners then they would be all the more prepared to take 
similar measures to cut off vital supplies of German ore. After the Altmark incident, the German 
High Command drastically hastened its preparations for occupying Norway.336  
London was entirely prepared to accept the risk of German reprisals against the 
Scandinavian neutrals; but it was less prepared to thwart a German attack, although it assured the 
Norwegians that it would regard an attack on Norway as tantamount to an attack on Britain.337 
London was well aware of the danger of a German attack on Norway but hesitancy and poor 
decision-making of the Supreme War Council delayed preventative action until too late. 
Immediately after the conclusion of peace in March, Churchill suggested to the War Cabinet that 
the Allies occupy Narvik without the pretext of helping Finland. The German High Command 
feared that once in Norway, the British, with its naval superiority, would be impossible to drive 
out.338 Cabinet, however, thought that it would be politically disastrous to violate Norwegian 
neutrality in such a way. In a meeting of the Supreme War Council, the French urged Britain to 
occupy Norwegian ports and eventually agreed to mine German inland waterways, but then lost 









Eventually the Supreme War Council, gingerly and belatedly, decided to take the step of 
mining the coastal waters of Norway 25 days after the peace of Moscow.340 After laying the 
mines, London would prepare an invasion force and await the German response. If the Germans 
invaded Scandinavia, or were clearly about to do so, the Allies would then have the political 
justification to dispatch their force to Narvik, Trondheim, and Bergen.341 Churchill optimistically 
felt that a German attack would be advantageous because it would justify Allied intervention in 
Scandinavia and put the neutrals squarely on the side of the Allies. The Allies could then apply 
their “overwhelming sea power” to quickly “liquidate them in a week or two.”342  
Unlike the Allies, the Germans were not willing to allow the enemy to make the first 
move and gain the strategic advantage. Germany gave no thought to the political considerations 
of the Scandinavian neutrals and was thus better prepared to face the realities of war. By the 
morning of April 9, the Allied governments realized they had delayed too long, and that German 
movement had preceded a full scale invasion of Norway. Germany occupied Narvik, Trondheim, 
Bergen, and Stravanger, as well as Denmark.343 The Allies immediately launched their chaotic 
Norwegian expedition with orders for naval forces to push their way into Narvik and Bergen, 
while Trondheim was to be left alone.344 In the debacle that followed, constant political 
intervention in military decisions, changes of plan, and unpreparedness for the winter conditions 
virtually guaranteed the failure of the Allied operations. 
Instead of gaining a foothold in Scandinavia and cutting Germany off from its vital 









indecisive, and unorganized. Britain’s evacuation left Norway to its own defences. As far as 
Finland was concerned, the British failure in Norway led to its isolation between Germany and 
the Soviet Union.345 Any country that controlled Norway would have the key position to control 
all trade in the Baltic Sea and the North Sea.346 Petsamo was the only port left that gave Finland 
access to Britain and France, but Britain had cut all trade and traffic communications with 
Scandinavia and renounced its war trade agreement with Finland. The Norway campaign broke 
nearly all connections with Britain. Pro-British orientation was no longer an option if Finland 
wished to ensure its security and foreign trade.347 
For Finland, Germany was the only remaining option to ensure its security. Finland 
exhausted all other possibilities. The Allies were no longer interested in Finland after the Winter 
War and their war policies had led to German occupation of Norway. Even though Finland had 
sought to strengthen its ties with Britain and France after the Winter War, it had pursued other 
alternatives as well. Before Germany took Norway, Finland’s hope lay in a Scandinavian 
defensive alliance. Britain and France had offered no practical help in the Winter War and the 
United States was too remote to offer security. A Scandinavian defensive alliance was perhaps 
the best chance for Finland to remain outside the European war and guarantee its security against 
the Soviet Union. Immediately after Finland concluded peace with the Soviet Union, it entered 
negotiations for the proposed alliance with Sweden and Norway. The Scandinavians welcomed 
the alliance on the condition that the terms guaranteed that members of the alliance would not be 







be strictly defensive.348 However, the Soviet Union disapproved of the proposal and the German 
occupation of Norway made such an alliance impossible. 
Helsinki did not need to be pro-German to realize that rapprochement with Germany was 
in Finland’s best national interests. Sweden was weak and Europe was divided; Germany was the 
only power capable of giving Finland security against the Soviet Union.349 The logic of events 
and the political realism with which Finland approached geopolitical developments virtually 
predetermined that Finland would seek German security against further advances of the Soviet 
Union. Given the geographic position of Finland, after Germany invaded Norway Finland’s fate 
became tied to the future developments between the great powers of the Soviet Union and 
Germany.350 German-Finnish trade negotiations began even before the campaign in Norway was 
settled. With Finland’s principle trading partner out of the picture, Finland would need to rely 
heavily on trade with Germany. In the Second World War, trade and politics were closely 
interdependent and Finland was brought into Germany’s economic sphere. In June 1940 Finland 
concluded trade agreements with Germany after having to confess that the orientation of Finnish 
trade toward the western democracies had been a mistake.351 
Finnish historians and apologists of Finnish war policy have long argued over the degree 
to which Finland was responsible for its co-belligerence with Germany: did Finland gamble by 
choosing what it perceived to be the winning side in 1940-1941, as Anthony Upton suggested, or 








Wuorinen have maintained?352 This debate has largely centred around questions of when and if 
Finland knew of German invasion plans for the Soviet Union, and if it participated in a defensive 
‘continuation’ war or a war of revenge. However, the events and geopolitical shift after the peace 
of Moscow constitute the major turning point in Finland’s international orientation. Finland 
shared values with the democratic west and disdain for Nazism, and was determined to 
strengthen Finnish-Anglo relations after the war as a means of security against the Soviet Union. 
London, on the other hand, felt that Finland had outlived its usefulness. At the same time, 
Finland enthusiastically pursued a Scandinavian defensive alliance to maintain its neutrality and 
secure its continued independence. The attack on Norway that the Allies provoked ended Finnish 
trade with them, the corollary of which was increased trade with Germany. It also removed the 
Allies as an option for security against the USSR. Therefore, Allied war policy directly and 
indirectly fed the process that led to Finland’s co-belligerency with Germany. Since the 
defensive alliance had failed, Finland logically sought rapprochement with the only remaining 
power that could guarantee its security. It was not so much a matter of choice as a logical 
response to developments in the international situation. Since national security was Finland’s 
highest priority, political realism compelled Finland to look for security from the only remaining 









Chapter 4:  
Co-belligerency with Germany 
The Allied evacuation of Norway in the spring of 1940 marked the beginning of a 
geopolitical shift that placed Finland squarely between the totalitarian giants of Germany and the 
Soviet Union. As Finnish-Soviet relations once again unravelled, it was Germany, not the 
democracies of the west, which was in a position to assist Finland – and to exploit Finland’s 
situation for its own purposes. After Germany occupied Norway, the Soviet Union’s security 
requirements increased dramatically; it consequently stepped up its post-treaty demands on 
Finland. Ever suspicious of its heavy-handed eastern neighbour, the Finns stubbornly resisted 
Soviet demands. By the fall of 1940 Stalin’s best security option was to settle the Finnish 
question in the same fashion he had attempted 1939. The difference in the fall of 1940 was that 
Finland was able to use Germany as leverage to safeguard its independence and a Soviet 
invasion of Finnish territory was forestalled – but only temporarily.  
Finland proved in 1939-1940 that it would fight, alone if necessary, to maintain its 
independence. It is therefore logical that Finland chose to retaliate against the Soviet Union as a 
co-belligerent of Germany; yet this action undermined Finland’s traditionally good relations with 
the western democracies. Although the patterns of behaviour between the Soviet Union and 
Finland bear a stark resemblance to the prelude to the Winter War, the international realignment 
of 1940-1941 ultimately led to a reversal of relations with the democracies, where Finland had 
found so much sympathy for its cause in 1939-1940.   
In the summer of 1940, Finnish-Soviet relations quickly deteriorated as Moscow 
increased its security demands and Finland refused to satisfy them. “The Soviet government,” 
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explains Jukka Nevakivi, “saw no need to handle Finland with kid gloves after having mangled it 
with a mailed fist.”353 Following the Peace of Moscow and Germany’s occupation of Norway, 
Soviet policy toward Finland fell into the same pattern of behaviour that led up to the Winter 
War. What the Finnish government failed to comprehend was that Moscow was not worried 
about the likelihood of Finnish aggression, but of a third power using Finland as a base of 
operations against Leningrad, with or without Finnish consent. The Peace of Moscow reflected 
the security needs of 1939. After Germany occupied Norway in the spring of 1940, Leningrad 
was even more vulnerable to invasion then before. With German victories in the west and the fall 
of France in the summer of 1940, the Soviet Union’s security needs grew exponentially.354 
 However, Finland stubbornly resisted Soviet demands. The peace treaty left Finland with 
a sense of isolation and insecurity, and naturally Helsinki was even more suspicious of Soviet 
intentions than in 1939. Finnish suspicions were confirmed when the Soviet Union obstructed 
Finnish plans for a Finnish-Swedish defensive alliance. Over the course of 1940 Moscow also 
demanded that Finland demilitarize the Aland Islands; turn over the Petsamo nickel mines to 
Soviet control; and cede control of Hanko, a port city on the southern coast of Finland, and to 
give the Soviets access to it by railway.355 Moscow also aroused Finnish concern when it turned 
an autonomous Soviet republic of Karelia into the Karel-Finn Republic that included, along with 
Soviet lands, the Karelian Isthmus annexed from Finland after the Winter War. The new republic 
was to be headed by Otto Kuusinen, the former head of a puppet government the Soviet Union 
had fruitlessly attempted to set up in Finland during the Winter War. The Finns had looked on 







annexed from Russia by Romania in 1918: the Soviets first created the Moldovan Autonomous 
Republic within Ukraine in 1924 and then demanded in July 1940 that Romania cede Moldova to 
the Soviet Union, citing the ethnic unification principle as the basis for the demand. Helsinki 
drew the obvious conclusion that the Karel-Finn Republic would serve the same purpose. 356 
 The apprehension with which Finland viewed the ever-increasing Soviet demands was 
heightened by a Soviet attack on the Finnish passenger plane Kaleva. Tension grew between the 
two countries when on June 14 the plane was shot down on its routine passage from Tallinn to 
Helsinki by two Soviet aircraft. The Finnish pilot and crew, as well as all passengers were killed. 
The target of the attack was a French diplomatic messenger whose bag was recovered by a 
Russian submarine. Finland was pressured to refrain from protests or demands for compensation 
and officially attributed the loss of the plane to unknown causes.357 
 Since Hitler’s penchant for eastern expansion was no secret, Stalin probably concluded 
that after the fall of France, Russia was now more vulnerable to German designs. At the very 
least he was certainly alarmed by Germany’s new advantage in strength, with continental Europe 
at its disposal. Therefore in the summer of 1940 it was the obvious move for the Soviet Union to 
strengthen its perimeters.358 The mutual assistance treaties made with the Baltic states in 1939 
still guaranteed their own sovereignty, although these states were hostile to Moscow. On June 
14, the Soviet Union offered Lithuania an ultimatum. It accused the Lithuanian government of 







restructure its government. Lithuania complied and was occupied on June 15.359 Estonia and 
Latvia were soon occupied in similar fashion. According to the later account of Lithuanian Prime 
Minister Kreve-Mickevicius, Molotov stated that “You must be realistic enough to understand 
that in the future small states will disappear. Your Lithuania together with the other Baltic states, 
including Finland, will be included within the honourable family of Soviet peoples.”360 
 In the Baltic republics, waves of Soviet propaganda and Soviet-organized left-wing 
political demonstrations preceded each annexation.361 Although Finland had already leased 
Hanko to the Soviet Union in response to pressure, Helsinki worried that the entirety of Finland 
might be next. Meanwhile the Soviet-sponsored leftist group SNS – or the Finnish-Soviet peace 
and friendship society – rapidly escalated its propaganda and political activity. On June 25, when 
a Russo-Finnish trade agreement was due to be signed, Moscow abruptly informed the Finnish 
delegation that the agreement must be postponed. The following day the SNS released a 
statement echoing the demands and accusations previously directed at the Baltic republics.362 On 
July 27, the German ambassador in Moscow reported that “The Soviet attitude toward Finland is 
characterized by the fact that the Soviet Government keeps Finland under pressure with ever new 
demands.” He also warned that “the further intentions of the Soviet Government are wholly 
obscure.”363 
 The activities of the SNS became increasingly alarming. The American minister in 











renewed Soviet aggression.364 In late July, Molotov demanded that Tanner resign and the SNS be 
granted a free hand to carry out its activity unopposed.365  On July 25 the British minister in 
Helsinki, Gordon Vereker, expressed his concern to London over what was coming next now 
that Soviet-sponsored groups were agitating Finnish society and that the Soviets had pressured 
the Finns to permit it.366 In a speech to the Seventh Session of the Supreme Soviet on the 
annexation of the Baltic States on August 1, Molotov warned that “if certain elements in Finnish 
ruling circles do not cease their persecution of those elements in Finland which are trying to 
strengthen good-neighbourly relations with the USSR, then our relations with Finland may 
suffer.”367  
 In early August, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel in Germany received reports that Soviet 
troops had moved adjacent to the Finnish border. On August 10 he indicated his concern that a 
new Russo-Finnish war was a very real danger.368 Western observers also saw cause for alarm. 
The British minister in Moscow warned London that Molotov’s references to Finland were “very 
foreboding.”369 London expected that the Soviet Union would annex Finland as it did with the 
Baltic states as soon as Germany was distracted in the west.370 On August 7, H.F. Arthur 
Schoenfeld, the American minister in Helsinki telegraphed Secretary Hull to query whether the 
















of the Baltic countries to warrant the belief that the Soviets harboured similar intentions with 
regard to Finland.371 When Hull forwarded Schoenfeld’s concerns to the legation in Moscow, the 
minister replied that based on recent troop movements and the fact that every instance of Soviet 
aggression had been preceded by propaganda and Soviet press campaigns, “the present campaign 
against Finland should be regarded as ominous.”372 
 German intervention temporarily saved Finland from another war with the Soviet Union. 
In Moscow, the British legation had admitted that since Finland was isolated, its fate would 
ultimately be determined by how much leverage Helsinki could get from Germany.373 Until mid-
August Germany had ignored Finland’s attempts at rapprochement intended to secure its safety. 
When all signs seemed to point toward renewed Soviet aggression, Keitel suggested that some 
word of warning be issued to the Soviet Union.374 According to the diary of General Franz 
Halder, Hitler changed his mind about Finland because of the immediacy of the Soviet threat to 
Finland. Since Helsinki was now under so much pressure that it would likely make any 
concession in return for German protection, Hitler decided that Germany would immediately 
agree to the sale of weapons to Finland in exchange for transit rights for German troops.375  
 For Helsinki, the presence of German troops on Finnish territory was a small price to pay 
to avert renewed Soviet aggression. In a visit to Berlin in November, Molotov confirmed 












times during his meeting with Hitler that the Finnish question was yet “unsolved” and that Stalin 
would like to rectify the situation with Finland along the lines of the secret protocol in the non-
aggression pact of 1939; he essentially asked Hitler for a free hand in the Baltic to bring Finland 
under Soviet dominance. Hitler firmly replied that the geopolitical situation had changed. 
Germany had secured its sphere of influence but the Soviet Union had failed. Since Germany 
was currently dependent on Finnish nickel, it was now too late to fix that mistake and Germany 
would not tolerate another Soviet war with Finland under any circumstances.376 
 The German presence in Finland in the fall of 1940 strained relations with Britain. 
Beginning as early as July, the British had interfered with Finnish shipping traffic in answer to 
increased trade with Germany. The Royal Navy illegally seized vessels and confiscated goods. 
Only after American pressure did Britain agree to grant navicerts to Finnish shipping.377 After 
the transit agreement with Germany, the British Foreign Office adopted an indignant stance 
toward Finland. On September 25, Halifax demanded that the British minister in Helsinki issue a 
formal complaint against Finland because it had granted concessions, “which amounts to direct 
assistance,” to an enemy of Britain.378 On October 6, Halifax explained that London was 
outraged at Finland’s lack of “gratitude” for British help in the Winter War and condemned 













trade partners. The “Finnish Government,” he concluded, “had sold their soul to the devil and 
had not even got a price for it.”379 
 Minister Vereker, however, reminded Halifax that the evacuation of Norway was an 
indication that “we were abandoning northern countries to their fate.”380 London “would prefer 
to see Finland absorbed by Russia to seeing her help the German war effort in the slightest 
degree.” However, Finland “cannot be gainsaid the right to seek means of keeping herself alive 
and free.”381 Vereker tactfully pointed out that it would be unfair to forget that British policy 
“may have contributed to drive Finland into the arms of Germany, and that drowning men are apt 
to clutch at straws. Once we force Finns into making a pact with the devil,” he continued, “it 
would be invidious to complain that they are coming off second best, seeing that the devil is not 
easy person to deal with.”382 He concluded by stating “I defy any country in Finland’s position 
not to make some attempt to trim its sail according to the wind.”383  
 War was not in Finnish interests. A country of three and a half million does not welcome 
involvement in great power contests, especially after the devastation so recently suffered in the 
Winter War. According to the British legation in Stockholm, by the fall of 1940 Helsinki was so 
desperate to avoid war that in December 1940 it suggested to Sweden that Finland surrender 
itself to Sweden as a vassal state, in order to enhance its security against Russia and avoid 
entanglement in a great power war.384 Both Germany and the Soviet Union opposed the 











to ward off further Soviet aggression; yet the reason for Germany’s interest was to exploit the 
Finnish position in a war of aggression against the Soviet Union. As early as July 21, 1940, 
during the preliminary studies for a Russian campaign, Halder recognized that Germany could 
easily exploit Finland’s position to draw it into the war on the German side. Hitler too, by the 
end of July, acknowledged that Finland must be brought in.385  
 The Germans did not inform Finland of the active role that they planned to assign to the 
Finnish Army in Operation Barbarossa until very late. Apparently, the Germans simply assumed 
that Finland would participate. German reasoning is not difficult to decipher: Finland could not 
simultaneously avoid war and maintain its independence. Since it had already proved willing to 
resort to war to safeguard its independence, even against overwhelming odds, it was safe to 
assume that Finland would not forfeit its independence without a fight. The Soviet Union had 
already hinted of its intention to occupy Finland: geographically, Finland was simply too close to 
Leningrad.  
In the event of war, the Soviet Union would certainly attack and seek to occupy Finland 
because it currently granted passage to German troops and could be used as a base to move 
against Murmansk and Leningrad. There was no chance for Finland to remain neutral because it 
would either be occupied by Germany or the Soviet Union. If Finland refused to fight the Soviet 
Union and renounced the German Transit Treaty, it would have led to a conflict with Germany 
and placed Finland’s fate in Soviet hands.386 Furthermore, Germany was in a position to either 
starve the Finns into obedience or simply occupy Finland. In the fall of 1939 Stalin had 






can assure you that it is not possible. The Great Powers will simply not allow it.”387 After the 
Winter War Mannerheim believed that the only hope Finland had of remaining outside a great 
power conflict was a Scandinavian alliance. By March 1941 the British legation in Helsinki 
reported that the widespread Finnish desire to be left in peace to reconstruct a shattered national 
life was “pathetic but hopeful.”388 Neutrality was never a realistic option. Finland had little room 
to manoeuvre, and its involvement in the war was more or less a foregone conclusion.  
In the prelude to Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union, Germany had only obliquely 
warned Finland of the possibility of its involvement in a future war. The Germans simply worked 
under the assumption that the international situation would leave the Finns no choice but to 
participate in the war. Until April 28, the Germans had not even planned how and where to 
initiate the Finns. Prior to the invasion, the Germans led the Finns to believe that war was yet 
improbable and a negotiated settlement benefitting Finland was to be the most likely outcome.389 
The German ambassador, Waldemar Blucher, expressed worry that perhaps his government’s 
efforts to persuade Helsinki that war was not an imminent danger were too effective. Finland was 
making no preparations for war, no plans for a shelter program, evacuation of Helsinki, or the 
buildup of essential supplies.390  
On May 20 a Finnish delegation led by General Erik Heinrichs met with German officers 
to discuss the actions that would be taken if the Soviet Union attacked Finland. Not until the 









aggression. Even in these negotiations the Germans framed war as only a vague possibility.391 
Berlin insisted to President Ryti that negotiations were underway and asked for a minimum and a 
maximum program of Finnish requests. The least that Finland wanted was a guarantee of 
independence and a few minor concessions from Moscow, including deliveries of grain. Its 
maximum program asked for a return of the 1939 frontiers with certain adjustments in the 
interest of Leningrad’s security. Helsinki, like the rest of the world, believed that such 
negotiations were in progress and the deception of Finland was kept up until at least June 10.392  
Although the Germans framed their proposals on a ‘just in case’ basis, there can be no 
doubt of the tacit cooperation of the Finns. In negotiations with German military leaders in 
Helsinki on June 3, the Finns agreed to a general arrangement for the arrival of German troops in 
Finland, Finnish mobilization and the division of operations between Germany and Finland. 
However, Finland was unprepared for an open war of aggression and it made this stipulation 
abundantly clear to Germany.393 By June 11, only days before Operation Barbarossa, Berlin 
informed Finland that they had no intention of seeking a peaceful solution with the Soviet Union 
and the Finns were told to mobilize on June 16.394   
The German invasion put the Finns in an awkward position. The Soviet Union was a 
genuine threat to Finland’s existence and Finland would have already been at war had not 
Germany intervened. Furthermore, Germany had the leverage to either occupy Finland or force it 
into war. On the morning of June 22, Hitler’s statement on German radio that German troops 








further.395 The Finnish government stated that Finland was not at war. On June 23, Helsinki 
instructed Gripenberg to inform London that Finland had not taken offensive action and would 
not do so, although the Soviets had already attacked the island port of Kokat and two Finnish 
warships.396 On June 24 the Soviet Foreign Office accused Finland of an unprovoked attack on 
Russia. Moscow threatened that it would not be forgotten and would be avenged by 200 million 
Russians at a future date.397 Much like the prelude to the Winter War, Moscow followed its false 
allegations with an attack. Soviet aircraft indiscriminately bombed civilian objectives and on 
June 25 the Finns shot down 23 aircraft over Finland amid considerable damage.398 On the same 
day, the Soviet Union announced the commencement of hostilities with Finland.399  
Historians have long disputed the degree to which Finland was complicit in a war of 
aggression on the Soviet Union. The orthodox Finnish interpretation claims Finnish innocence 
and German manipulation. In his memoirs, Mannerheim claims that Hitler’s statement was made 
to induce the Soviet Union to attack Finland and thereby force it into war. John Wuorinen and 
Waldemar Erfurth have argued that Finland was simply swept along by the international 
situation and had little or no knowledge of German invasion plans. After the 1960s, historians 












calls “Finland’s decision to throw its lot in with Germany.”400 Some have even suggested that 
Finland saw the opportunity to pursue a war of revenge against the Soviet Union.  
However, with little room to navigate the affairs of great powers, Finland’s real choice 
was to preserve its independence at all costs. Finland was isolated from all but Germany and the 
Soviet Union after Britain evacuated Norway; Soviet advances in the summer and fall of 1940 
clearly demonstrated Moscow’s intent to annex Finland, which Soviet-German negotiations later 
proved; and after using German leverage to hold off Soviet aggression, Finland’s fate was 
effectively tied to the future relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. If there was to be 
war between the two totalitarian giants, Finland would either enter the war to preserve its 
independence or surrender itself to foreign control. Finland’s ‘choice’ was all but inevitable – 
dictated by political realism and the logic of events. 
Since Finland could not prevent Germany from using it as a base of operations against 
Russia, nor the Soviet Union from attacking Finland, the logical decision was to cooperate with 
Germany while pursuing independent war aims: an intelligent adaption to a situation over which 
Helsinki had no control.401 Finland had no wish to be drawn into the greater war. Neither did 
Helsinki wish to choose between the western democracies, for which it had an ideological and 
cultural preference, and Germany, whom it relied on for its security against the Soviet Union. 
Therefore, Finland pursued independent objectives: trying to navigate between Germany and the 
democracies while fighting the Soviet Union. Finnish leaders wanted to portray the new war as a 
‘continuation war,’ separate from the war of the Axis because Finland was fighting a war against 






unwilling to sign any political agreements with Germany and never joined the Axis. It chose the 
term ‘co-belligerent’ to describe a relationship in which two separate entities with separate goals 
were at war with a common enemy.402 
The official Finnish explanation of a separate war, or a war within a war, was 
problematic. That the new war was simply an unavoidable continuation of the last was a 
simplistic interpretation; yet in many ways the new war was similar to the Winter War. Finland 
fought for its own national interests, namely its independence and security against the Soviet 
Union, and technically it was a war of retaliation against Soviet aggression. In that sense the 
Finnish war was undeniably separate from the war launched by the Axis: a nation has a right to 
fight for the preservation of its independence. However, Finland’s insistence that it fought its 
own war separate from the greater conflict was contradictory. The Finnish war was unavoidably 
connected to the greater war because the Finns were under a degree of German control. The very 
fact that Germany refused to allow Finland to conclude a separate peace – which they did 
anyway in 1944 – is indicative of closer cooperation than Helsinki was willing to admit. 
However, despite the considerable leverage that Germany had over Finland, the Finns 
were uncooperative when German directives did not overlap with Finnish objectives. Helsinki 
went to great lengths to preserve its independence of action from Germany. Finland was different 
from the minor Axis states because it retained independent military command and refused to be 
co-opted into fighting for German objectives. The Finnish separate war claim was not just to 
satisfy the Allies; it was a genuine objective. Helsinki wanted to remain as independent as 





adamantly refused to grant Germany the same nickel concession in Petsamo that they had denied 
the Russians, and even heavy German pressure could not break down Finnish resistance.403  
In August 1941 Keitel requested that the Finnish Army should attack Leningrad from the 
north as the Germans attacked from the south. Mannerheim refused. On September 4, General 
Alfred Jodl personally visited the Finnish military command to try to convince the Finns of the 
necessity of their participation in the attack on Leningrad. When Mannerheim repeated his 
refusal, Jodl is said to have exclaimed “Can’t you then do anything to show yourself co-
operative?”404 The Finns continued to desist from participating in the attack even to the extent of 
refusing to shell the city.405 In addition, Finland denied the German request cut the traffic along 
the Murmansk railway, a major supply route to Russia’s only ice-free port in the north. Although 
the Finnish Army crossed over the 1939 boundaries, to the outrage of the west, they only 
advanced far enough to establish a naturally defensible position between Lake Onega and Lake 
Ladoga. If the Winter War had taught them anything, it was that the 1939 boundary was too long 
for a state of three and a half million to defend. Afterwards, on December 6, 1941, the Finns 
halted all offensive actions despite German protests.  
The power-shift in northern Europe led to Finland’s involvement in the great power war. 
Germany’s position in Norway and the defeat of France dramatically increased Soviet security 
requirements, reflected in their plans to annex Finland. Since Finland’s traditional allies were 
both indifferent and unable to support it against the Soviet Union, Helsinki welcomed 







situation as relations between Germany and the Soviet Union deteriorated. Finland was caught in 
a great power war, in which it sought to navigate between the goodwill of Germany and the 
democracies by pursuing limited objectives that corresponded to its national interests. However, 
the reversal of the geopolitical situation would also bring with it a reversal of relations with the 
democracies, even though Finland fought the same enemy against which these democracies had 















Chapter 5:  
Strained Relations: Finland, Britain and the United States, 1940-1941 
 The neutral observer would appreciate Finland’s difficult situation. United States public 
opinion remained largely pro-Finnish. The Soviet Union followed the same pattern of aggression 
that began with the Nazi-Soviet pact and carried on throughout 1940.  However, although public 
opinion in the United States and even the British Dominions remained largely sympathetic 
toward Finland, Finnish national interests in 1941 conflicted with the basic interests of Britain. 
Finland lost British sympathy in 1941. Although Finland fought for the same objectives in 1941 
as it had in 1939, this time it had a different sponsor and fought in different circumstances. 
In the British perspective in 1939, Finland was not simply a victim of a clear-cut Soviet 
attack. The British perceived Finland to be an ally in the common struggle against aggression. 
By 1941 the situation was quite different. Operation Barbarossa rehabilitated the image of the 
Soviet Union because it stood virtually alone against Nazi Germany. Britain now considered 
Finland a traitor, although it once again fought the same enemy. It did not matter that Finland 
fought for independent objectives; the Finnish cause now conflicted with basic British interests 
because the Soviet Union became Britain’s ally. The enemy of Britain’s ally became Britain’s 
enemy, and London condemned Finland for turning to the only nation left that could guarantee 
its security against the Soviet Union.  
  Britain made it harder for Finland to secure essential materials such as aluminum, high-
octane gasoline, rubber, bronze, and tin.406 As the economic blockade grew tighter, Finland was 





German-occupied Europe. Theoretically it should not have been in British interests to increase 
Germany’s leverage over Finland by cutting off all ties to the west. However, on June 14 London 
effectively declared economic war by completing its blockade of Finland.407 On June 19 The 
Times reported that Britain will no longer grant navicerts to ships destined to Finland because 
“Finland is not in a position to be truly independent.”408 By July 16, Schoenfeld informed Hull 
that the blockade was now “absolute” and that the British had seized substantial amounts of 
Finnish shipping to divert to other purposes.409  
Finland and the Soviet Union traded places in the public eye. The nation that was inspired 
by ‘brave little Finland’ and outraged at Soviet aggression in 1939 demanded a declaration of 
war against Finland by November 1941. On June 22, after Hitler’s statement about fighting 
alongside the Finns, Churchill declared that “Any man or state who marches with Hitler is our 
foe.”410 The same day, The Times incorrectly reported that Finland had participated in the 
German offensive. In coordination with Romanian and German troops, Finnish forces were said 
to be in the process of making a drive on Leningrad from the north.411 The press, preoccupied 
with victimizing the Soviet Union, refused to criticize Soviet attacks on Finnish territory. On 
June 29, the Sunday Times actually condoned the Russian air attacks of June 25. The newspaper 
insisted that Finland was “very properly bombed by the Russians” and berated Finland for its 
“betrayal” of the Allied cause. It echoed the sentiments that Churchill expressed in his speech by 











Finland’s actions, the Sunday Times declared. Instead, “she was bound passively to accept the . . 
. bombing,” which the Sunday Times insisted was a just consequence of Finland’s relations with 
Germany. The newspaper concluded with an ominous warning that “the people of this country 
will not lightly forget this crime.”412 In the Sunday Dispatch on the same day, author H.G. Wells 
wrote that Stalin had very rightly attacked “the blue swastika – Finland.” He criticized 
sentimental Americans, who spoke about “brave little Finland,” for their ongoing sympathy: 
“What would you say if Staten Island was in the hands of a brave little power which had built a 
formidable defense line and could bomb New York and all its ships?”413 
Finland received considerable criticism in the British Parliament as well. On July 2, 
Labour politician Sydney Silverman spoke out against Britain’s continuation of relations with 
Finland. “Does not the present attitude of the Finnish Government,” he questioned, “in allowing 
themselves to be used by Germany and themselves taking part in aggression upon Russia, 
contrast very unfavourably from other quarters at other times?”414 Liberal politician Geoffrey 
Mander echoed Silverman’s accusations. On July 9 he suggested that the Foreign Office make it 
clear that in the final peace settlement the actions of those who have directly or indirectly 
assisted the enemy will be taken into account. “Will the right hon. gentleman [Anthony Eden] 
not make it perfectly clear that people cannot have it both ways,” he asked, “and that at the peace 
settlement we shall remember those who have been our friends and not forget those who have 










of Germany in the war proceeding between Germany and Russia, and that His Majesty’s 
government does not want to comment on that fact?”416 
The Finnish government took the anti-Finnish pronouncements in the British press very 
seriously.417 Vereker reported that Finland resented Britain’s lack of understanding for its 
situation. He reminded the Foreign Office that in the Finnish view, Soviet Russia was the 
ultimate evil, beside which even Nazism seemed relatively wholesome. The Finns could not 
understand how a country such as Britain, which fought a war against aggression, could be allied 
with the Bolsheviks. Vereker summarized the Finnish attitude toward Britain as follows: “Great 
Britain has adopted the fundamental principle that she is primarily engaged on a crusade against 
Nazi Germany, and that all other considerations must be subordinated to this end. This is quite 
reasonable since Nazi Germany is Great Britain’s greatest menace. But in the circumstances, 
Great Britain must allow Finland freedom to define Russia as her greatest menace and 
subordinate all other considerations to the downfall of Soviet Russia.”418 
Much of the British public favoured a break of relations with Finland because of the 
widely held sentiment that the enemy of Britain’s ally was an enemy of Britain; and certain 
political elements wanted Britain to make the first move in dissolving relations. As early as June 
22, London informed its minister in Finland that he should take the responsibility to decide 
whether to stay or leave.419 In the confusion that followed the German invasion, London did not 










However, Halifax informed Gripenberg early on that he had resisted Cabinet pressure to break 
off relations. “But if you attack Russia,” Halifax warned, “we will have a new and very serious 
situation. I hope sincerely that that won’t happen, because then my own efforts will be strained to 
the utmost.”421 
It was in London’s interests to maintain its relations with Finland. Gripenberg suggested 
in his memoirs that London was reluctant to break off relations because of the effect if might 
have on American opinion. America’s sympathies for Finland were well known, and the Daily 
Telegraph’s Washington correspondent had warned the British government that the American 
public would not understand or react well to news of Britain’s close cooperation with the Soviet 
Union.422 More importantly, London kept its legation in Helsinki because Vereker and his staff 
were a valuable source of intelligence.423 The Times openly admitted as much after relations had 
collapsed.424 Although Finland also preferred to retain diplomatic relations, Germany wanted the 
British legation out of Helsinki for the same reason London wished it to stay: according to Berlin 
Helsinki had become a “hotbed of espionage and sabotage.”425  
In response to German pressure, Helsinki sent an aide-memoire to London on July 28 to 
ask if the Foreign Office saw good reason for the two countries mutually “suspending” the 
activities of their legations. The note referred to the illegal actions of the Royal Navy against 
Finnish shipping as well as Britain’s alliance to the Soviet Union.426 The purpose of the note was 










Foreign Office published the note. London used the opportunity to inform the world that Finland 
had unilaterally severed relations with Britain, and not in mutual agreement, so that Finland 
would bear the blame in the public eye of both Britain and the United States.427 Two days after 
Finland sent its aid-memoire, the British Fleet Air Arm bombed the Liinahamari and Petsamo 
regions of Finland in an attack that killed Finnish civilians and damaged property. The Finnish 
government considered the attack on Finnish territory to be the answer to their aide-memoire and 
immediately severed relations.428 
The British Parliament felt that the break in relations had not come soon enough. 
Previous supporters of Finland were now silent. Since July, Parliament had attacked the Foreign 
Office for continuing relations with Finland on the basis that Finland was a “voluntary ally” of 
Germany in a war against a “voluntary ally” of Britain.429 After the Finnish note was published 
in British newspapers, Labour politician Manny Shinwell insisted that Britain immediately break 
relations amid calls for more drastic action against Finland.430 “Is it not clear,” Sydney Silverman 
asked on August 6, “either Finland is pursuing a war of conquest or is desirous of conquest in 
Russia, or that a section of the Finnish people, led by Marshal Mannerheim, are defying their 
own Government? In either case,” he demanded, “is there any reason why this country should 
not be strongly on the side of Russia in the Russo-Finnish war?”431 
The British press grew increasingly hostile to Finland and echoed sentiments in tune to 











British people have “no desire to minimize the embarrassment of Finland’s position.” 432 The 
German invasion of Russia had rehabilitated Stalin’s image in Britain as a benevolent dictator; 
and the British had already forgotten that the incompetency of their war policy in northern 
Europe bore a share of the blame for Finland’s predicament in the first place. British attitudes 
toward Finland and the Soviet Union in 1939-1940 had undergone a complete reversal by the fall 
of 1941. In the ultimate irony of British opinion, the Soviet Union was now inconceivably the 
victim of blatant aggression from the relatively minute nation of Finland. The Times declared 
that when Finland “chose . . . to break off diplomatic relations with Great Britain and declare war 
upon Russia” it became “the tool of Nazi Germany.” According to The Times, Finland was now 
“an agent of naked aggression against her powerful Russian neighbour.”433  
By September Stalin had applied pressure on Britain to assist the Soviet Union against 
Finland. He specifically wanted Britain to declare war on Finland but according to British 
reports, a declaration of war would likely isolate Finland further still and would perhaps motivate 
the Finns to commit themselves to German objectives. In a note to Stalin, Churchill promised 
that “we are willing to put any pressure upon Finland in our power, including immediate 
intimation that we will declare war upon them if they advance beyond the old frontiers.”434 The 
Foreign Office complied with Soviet demands by publishing a threatening note on in which it 
called Finland an Axis power. On September 18, London communicated to Finland through 
Norway that “So long as Finland, in alliance with Germany, is carrying on an aggressive war 








consider Finland to be a member of the Axis, since it is impossible to separate the war which 
Finland is waging against Russia from the general European war.”435 The note went on to state 
that “if, therefore, the Finnish Government persist in invading purely Russian territory, a 
situation will arise in which Great Britain will be forced to treat Finland as an open enemy, not 
only while the war lasts, but also when peace comes to be made.”436 The note requested that 
Finland immediately terminate its war with the Soviet Union and evacuate all territories beyond 
its 1939 frontiers. 
According to the British minister in Sweden, the Finns received the British note with 
“feelings of astonishment and indignation.”437 The Finnish reply on October 6 categorically 
listed Finland’s justifications for war with the Soviet Union. It referred to the Soviet Union’s 
unprovoked attack in 1939 and the loss of Finnish territory; the fact that Finland was forced to 
fight alone while the Soviet Union suffered no consequences for its act of aggression; Soviet 
extortion, renewed demands and political interference during 1940-1941; Soviet intentions to 
annex Finland in the fall of 1940; and the renewed Soviet attack upon Finland in June 1941. 
Helsinki declared that it considered the current war with the Soviet Union to be a continuation of 
Finland’s war against Soviet aggression that began in 1939: a war strictly waged in self-defence. 
In regard to crossing the 1939 boundaries, Helsinki pointed out that Russia still held certain 
Finnish areas within the 1939 frontiers, and that Finland strategically required a shorter boundary 
in order to establish defensive lines.438 “Finland wages her defensive war free from all political 









concluded by stating, “Finland cannot understand how Great Britain, with whom Finland has 
wished, and wishes, to retain peaceful relations, could regard herself, merely because Finland is 
not on this occasion alone in fighting the Soviet Union, as entitled, nay, forced, to treat Finland 
as an open enemy.”439 
The Swedish daily newspaper Dagens Nyheter pointed out the obvious problems with 
London’s demand. “If the British demands were acceded to,” it wrote, “the Finnish armed forces, 
after having thrown their adversaries back to the east of it, would have to withdraw to a frontier 
which was in 1939 violated by the Soviet Army.” It supported the Finnish position, stating that 
“From a political point of view this could be conceived under certain conditions, but strategically 
and militarily it is absolutely impossible, and in a situation such as the one in which Finland 
finds herself strategic considerations doubtless take precedence over political ones, even if the 
two should not be in complete accord.”440 The Finnish press maintained that no halt to the 
Finnish campaign would be called until the Finnish Army reached strategic frontiers 
safeguarding Finland’s future peace. In a speech on September 27, the Finnish Minister of 
Labour declared, “our war aim is safety, so that we can live in peace and devote ourselves to 
peaceful occupations. But the peace we all long for must be lasting and nobody in Finland 
believes in a peace-treaty signed with the present Moscow dictators. We hope the war will soon 






the areas which constitute a threat to us.” Afterwards, “we can content ourselves with mounting 
guard and awaiting that peace which one day will dawn.”441 
The Finns were especially indignant that London had demanded an immediate 
withdrawal without binding the Soviet Union to any corresponding concessions, or granting 
Finland a guarantee against the Soviet Union.442 Great Britain had implied that it would go to 
war against Finland unless it made peace with the Soviet Union; yet it would not give assurances 
of assistance against further aggression by the Soviet Union, or Germany for that matter, which 
would certainly turn against Finland if the Finns made peace with Russia.443 President Ryti told 
the American minister in Helsinki that the Finns were prepared to do whatever was necessary in 
the interests of Finland’s security against Russia; they were certainly not going to withdraw 
without guarantees and it was unreasonable for London to ask that of them. “Finns had always 
been friendly to Britain,” Ryti declared, “but did not propose to die for British interests though 
they were prepared unanimously to sacrifice their lives if necessary for what they conceive to be 
Finnish interests.”444 
On October 17, and again on October 21, the Soviet ambassador repeated Stalin’s request 
that London declare war on Finland, Romania and Hungary. Churchill expressed his concern in a 
letter to the Dominions Office: “It is clear that the Soviet Government attach very great 










discourage them when at this critical juncture.”445 London felt pressure from Moscow but was 
hesitant to take the final step of declaring war because Britain would lose a significant amount of 
Finnish shipping that it currently used; and also because, according to Churchill, “a declaration 
of war would be distasteful to that body of American opinion which is favourable to the 
Finns.”446  
Furthermore, the opinion of the Dominions, with the exception of Australia, was firmly 
opposed to declaring war on Finland. South Africa reported that a declaration of war would be 
problematic because “Finland . . . has many sympathizers as Russians started the trouble by 
attacking Finland in collusion with Germany.” It pointed out that if Britain declared war, the 
Soviet Union would have justification to annex Finland and the Baltic countries at the conclusion 
of peace, which would be an unwanted embarrassment. New Zealand was likewise opposed to 
taking action against Finland. It declared that the attempt by the Finns to recover lost territory, 
after being stolen by Russia in a war in which the sympathies of the world were with Finland, 
should not lead to war although they were currently allied to Russia.447 Canada felt that a 
declaration of war would disrupt the war effort on the domestic front.448 A British report on 
Canada found that, “Canadians have shown very great interest in the part which Finland has been 
taking in the war. The general attitude has been to regard Finland as a helpless and reluctant 
pawn in the German game.”449 Australia believed that under the circumstances a declaration of 










On November 8, Stalin increased his pressure on London through a note in which he 
outlined several problems in Anglo-Soviet relations. He claimed that their current relations were 
defined by a lack of clarity. Britain and the Soviet Union must come to an understanding on war 
aims and on plans for the post-war organization of the peace. Thus far, Britain’s lack of action 
greatly alarmed the Kremlin. According to Stalin, the current British position suggested that the 
United States and Britain would combine to edge the Soviet Union out of the settlement of 
important matters at the peace.451 He advised London to reassure the Soviet Union through a 
gesture of mutual assistance. Stalin pointed to an “intolerable situation” that currently poisoned 
Anglo-Soviet relations: the question of the declaration of war on Finland, Romania, and 
Hungary.452 Stalin had asked for a simple show of mutual support but instead, London had 
procrastinated and publically embarrassed the Soviet Union. First of all, the request had been 
sent over secret diplomatic channels; yet Britain had characteristically leaked the information. 
“The whole problem is now being discussed at random in the press,” Stalin complained, “And 
after all that the British Government informs us of its negative attitude to our proposal.”453 “Why 
is all this being done?” he demanded, “To demonstrate the lack of unity between the U.S.S.R. 
and Great Britain?”454 
British newspapers indeed discussed the question. However, rather than demonstrating 
divided loyalties, the press unanimously expressed its support for a declaration of war against 








. .  seem to be only a logical recognition of present facts.”455 By November 4, the Evening 
Standard and The Manchester Guardian each urged London to declare war on Finland.456 On 
November 5, The Times stated that a declaration of war was “imperative.” The Manchester 
Guardian the next day claimed that, “the Finnish Government . . . is the instrument of its own 
imperialists.” By fighting Russia, the Finns were “fighting us and all for which the Allied cause 
stands,” and “for Finland to refuse [to withdraw] is to fight for Hitler.”457 
The British Parliament shared the general sentiments of the press and Members of 
Parliament lambasted the government for its hesitancy to respond to Russian demands.  On 
November 19 Geoffrey Mander questioned, “In view of the fact that it is now more than four 
weeks since our Soviet Allies asked us to take action on these lines, and that this is a simple 
thing we might do to help our Allies right away, does not my right hon. friend [Anthony Eden] 
think he ought to come to a decision in the near future?”458 Conservative MP Henry George 
Strauss concurred: “Does not the right hon. gentleman agree that, in principle at any rate, any 
country attacking Soviet Russia is attacking us and that any enemy of Soviet Russia is our 
enemy?”459 Sydney Silverman, one of the most vocal critics of British policy toward Finland, 
wanted to know, “what advantage is derived from hesitating to regard Allies of Germany as 
enemies of this country?”460 
Halifax strongly urged Cabinet to declare war on Finland, Romania and Hungary in order 











fight only at Russia’s expense.461 In late November, Finland made London’s decision more 
palatable when it reluctantly signed the Anti-Comintern Pact. In return, Germany delivered grain 
to Finland and promised not to pressure Finland to join the Axis.462 On November 28, the 
Finnish government received an ultimatum from London: the Finns must cease operations by 
December 5, or Britain will be forced to declare war. On November 29, Churchill sent a private 
letter to Mannerheim in which he expressed his personal regret that Britain would be forced to 
declare war on Finland “out of loyalty to our ally Russia.”463 An agreement with Russia would 
have been necessary in order to cease hostilities, and an agreement that would have satisfied the 
Russians would have very likely resulted in counter-measures on the part of Germany. On 
December 6, Finland’s Day of Independence, Britain declared war.464 
In Britain, war policy was determined by the realities of big power politics, and public 
opinion was determined by how Finland fit into their conception of Britain’s war. In the Winter 
War the public perceived Finland to be an ally against aggression; in 1941 Finland was an enemy 
against Britain’s new ally. In contrast, American attitudes toward Finland in 1941 were far more 
complex. As R. Michael Berry has concluded, Finland had an extraordinary status in the United 
States in 1941 because the Finnish-American bond of 1939-1940 was based on shared values 
rather than a shared enemy. Even though the Soviet Union became such an important American 
ally, and hostility toward the Soviet Union waned, the public disliked the communist dictatorship 









In the United States the public images of ‘brave little Finland’ as an ‘honest’ and 
freedom-loving democracy resonated with American ideals. Finland’s debt-paying and defense 
of democracy image was related to American principles of economic and political liberalism, as 
well as anti-totalitarian and anticommunist sentiments.465 These images survived the duration of 
the war and the American public bought into Finland’s assertion that it was fighting a separate 
war, even though the Finnish war ran contrary to Allied war aims. Finland’s ‘separate war’ thesis 
correlated with American ideals of a nation’s right to self-determination and self-defense. Even 
though the United States became an ally of the Soviet Union, the American public displayed a 
surprising degree of tolerance toward Finland, which was reflected by Finland’s exceptional 
status in American foreign policy. In the end, the conflict of allegiances was countered by each 
country’s willingness to compromise to maintain friendly relations. 
On June 26, 1941, Hjalmar Procope informed Washington that Finland had once again 
been forced into a defensive war. Despite being caught in the great power war, he asserted that 
Finnish policy would be to take a neutral position toward the democracies and pursue purely 
Finnish objectives.466 Procope asserted that Finland was a co-belligerent solely against Russia 
and wished to maintain good relations with the United States.467 On July 4, Prime Minister Ryti 
reassured Washington of Finland’s intentions of separateness from Germany. Finland would not 
depart from its national system of political and social organization and no political agreements 









the Finns, who were completely dependent on Germany for imports of food and material.468 In 
the American reply, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles expressed the United States 
government’s heartfelt condolences for Finland’s unenviable situation. “This Government, as 
well as the people of the United States,” he declared, “have the deepest interest in and sympathy 
for the people of Finland in their struggle to maintain their independence and liberty.”469 
American newspapers likewise expressed sympathetic regret for Finland’s renewed 
struggle and proved more than willing to give Finland the benefit of the doubt. The New York 
Times gave extensive coverage to Russian attacks on Finland that preceded the decision to go to 
war and reported that, “In a spirit of resignation and with special Finnish calmness the people are 
preparing to meet their hereditary foe.”470 The Christian Science Monitor also highlighted the 
Russian air attacks and declared that, “the Finns under other circumstances would probably do 
nothing to aid either of the totalitarian giants.”471 In an article entitled “Finland Fights Red 
Raiders,” the Chicago Daily Tribune condemned Russia’s “incessant bomb attacks” and 
“terroristic tactics,” and upheld Finland’s right to defend itself against Stalin’s intention to 
“destroy Finland as a nation.”472 The Washington Post also reported that Finland was fighting in 
“self defense.”473  
The Hartford Courant urged its readers not to judge Finland too harshly for its decision 
to fight alongside Germany. “The sight of Finland wobbling back in the direction of Germany 










appreciated before final judgment is passed upon Finland. The Finns, geographically and 
economically, simply cannot afford to take a large view of the world problem. They are caught in 
a vise between Russia and Germany, as they used to be caught between Russia and Sweden.”474 
The Courant went on to explain that, naturally, Finland “is first, last, and all the time pro-
Finnish,” and “she may have to side with one or the other or perish.”475 On June 27, the Courant 
declared that, “of all the countries in Europe little Finland excites American sympathy most.”476 
“She is confronted with the cruel choice,” it continued, “of trying to preserve her independence 
by fighting with or against either of two great belligerents now bent on each other’s 
destruction.”477 The Courant, like most American newspapers, presented the complexity of the 
Finnish situation with sympathy. “So here is poor Finland, one of the few remaining democracies 
left in the world, no more pro-Nazi than she is pro-Communist, valiantly trying to preserve her 
independence in an almost impossible situation.”478 
The Washington Post expressed bitterness at the geopolitical turn that pitted American 
interests against Finnish. “Our slogan was ‘all aid to the democracies,’” it reminded its readers, 
“but is that to include the Soviets? Can we fight the Finns? The one heroic people in Europe 
recognizing its obligations to the United States, when all others conveniently forgot, is now 
making its fight against the unspeakable Stalin.”479 “The wounds and miseries inflicted by the 










can we condemn the conduct of Finland?”480 “The Finnish Government and the Finnish people 
have been in a most difficult position,” the New York Times concurred, “Nobody could have 
expected them to fight on the Russian side . . . a stubborn allegiance to democratic principles 
made them reluctant to participate in the present conflict. Like all small nations, all they wanted 
was to be left alone.”481  
Both the internationalist and isolationist American press were sympathetic to the new 
Finnish war; yet Finnish objectives ran contrary to U.S. interests because virtually all Americans 
hoped for a Soviet victory against Germany. Thus, Finland assumed a rather paradoxical status in 
the United States, which was only sustainable because of the deeply rooted American-Finnish 
friendship. The Christian Science Monitor highlighted this phenomenon in an August 9 article, 
stating, “Finland is today’s outstanding example of the value of a good reputation whether in 
private life or in international affairs. Paradoxical as it may seem, Finland is now the fighting 
ally of the one nation above all others believed to menace the United States, yet there is no 
evidence that Finnish popularity in the United States has dropped one iota.”482 It maintained that 
Finland could have never kept its neutrality, and that Americans continued to look on “brave 
little Finland” as an international model for honesty and consciousness. “Few persons in the 
United States find themselves able to blame the little country,” the article continued, “to date,  
the Finnish attack on the Soviet Union has not brought forth a single condemnation from any 
responsible Administration official and nobody at the State Department seems to feel that it will 








that the defining characteristic of Finnish-American relations was the survival, rather than a 
breakdown, of friendly relations.484  
The United States’ low opinion of communism had not changed, although to Americans 
Nazi Germany constituted the immediate threat while the Soviet Union was now a bulwark to 
Nazism.485 After the German invasion of Russia, Under Secretary Welles explained that 
“realistic Americans” would understand that, “Any rallying of the forces opposing Hitler, from 
whatever sources these forces may spring, will hasten the eventual downfall of the present 
German leaders and will therefore rebound to the benefit of our own defense.”486 The Christian 
Science Monitor stated that it was among the “foremost in pointing to Communism’s basic 
conflict with free and Christian systems;” yet “whatever the antipathy of capitalism for Marxism, 
whatever the dislike of free men for Stalin’s despotism, whatever our recognition that 
Communism is a dangerous philosophy, the immediate attack comes from Nazism.”487 Though 
Americans were willing to accept the Soviet Union as a vital ally in the war against aggression, 
they never warmed up to communism and maintained their ideological preference for Finland. 
The positive American views on Finland, rather than negative views on the Soviet Union, are 
primarily what fueled American sympathy for Finland; yet because of their suspicion of 
communism and opposition to its ideals, Americans understood Finland’s struggle against the 
Soviet Union.  
The complexity of the situation offered new ammunition for the internationalist-








destroying each other in the east, but internationalists were not willing to risk a British defeat.488 
Isolationists used the international shift to point out the injustices of the war and sabotage 
Roosevelt’s intention to aid Russia: Finland fought a just war against a totalitarian aggressor but 
out of necessity the United States must support the totalitarian Soviet Union. Isolationists argued 
that to side with the British in the war, who were subject to Soviet pressure, was immoral, and to 
aid the Soviets would lead to the Soviet domination of Europe.489 Isolationists also blamed 
Britain for the Anglo-Finnish break in relations. The isolationist press reminded Americans that 
Britain had been inexcusably tardy in the delivery of supplies to Finland in the Winter War, yet 
ironically now provided both planes and ships to help the Russians fight the Finns.490 The 
isolationist Chicago Tribune presented Americans with the following argument on July 29: 
“Yesterday soviet Russia was considered a menace to civilization. Today soviet Russia is 
considered a cross between Galahad and Sir Lancelot . . .And yesterday Finland was the most 
meritorious and honorable of all European nations. Today she is fighting her old enemy, soviet 
Russia, associated with Stalin’s recent pal, Adolf Hitler [sic].”491 
 Americans offered little criticism even after Finnish soldiers crossed the 1939 borders; 
but as the Finnish Army advanced further into the Soviet Union, Finland became a foreign policy 
problem for Washington. While President Roosevelt tried to get a Lend-Lease proposal for the 
Soviet Union through Congress, Washington looked for other ways to help the Soviets in the 
meantime. One of the most obvious ways to assist Russia was to use the influence of the 









directly endangered American interests because most American aid to the Soviet Union would 
have to go through the northern Russian ports, and could easily be interfered with or blocked 
from Finnish territory.492  
On September 8, Hull spoke with Finnish Minister Procope in a meeting that revealed 
Washington’s complicated stance. Hull began the conversation by congratulating Finland on 
regaining the territory that Russia took in the war of 1939-1940, and then went on to express his 
concern about Finnish war aims. From the American viewpoint of self defense, he explained, 
Hitler constituted the greatest immediate threat to the security of the world and the United States. 
“Without contemplating the slightest injustice to Finland and her best interest,” the United States 
had no choice but to take a global view of things, and was therefore concerned that Finland 
would fight alongside Germany to the end of the war.493 Procope assured Hull that in his opinion, 
the Finns occupied Russian territory for security purposes only, and did not intend to fight the 
war to its conclusion.494 Anxious not to encroach on American interests, Helsinki informed 
Washington the next day that Finland would only continue its offensive until security objectives 
were met and that Finland would not participate in the siege of Leningrad under any 
circumstances.495  
Washington genuinely sympathized with the Finnish position. It was gratified to see 
Finland regain its lost territory and understood that Finland was compelled by both German 
pressure and its own security needs to continue its offensive. On September 17, Hull rejected the 









pass them on to Helsinki. He pointed out that previous Soviet policy would make this suggestion 
impossible for the Finns to accept without guarantees. He commented that “the Finns were in no 
mood to accept any assurances from the Soviet Government in view of the treatment they had 
received from the hands of that Government in the last two years.”496 Sympathy aside, however, 
Washington became more concerned with the global situation and how far Finland intended to 
go in the prosecution of its war against the Soviets. No matter how vigorously Finland insisted 
on the righteousness and limited objectives of its war, the fact remained that the longer Finland 
continued its offensive, the more it assisted the global ambitions of Germany.  
On October 3, Hull informed Procope that if Finland continued to prosecute its war, the 
United States would be forced to support Britain’s views in the interests of global security.497 
“Any other course for us would be suicidal,” he maintained.498 Hull sent the Finnish government 
formal notes of a much more threatening tone on October 25 and 28. He accused the Finns of 
giving “invaluable military aid to Nazi world aggression,” which constituted a direct threat to the 
future of the United States.499 If Finland did not desist, it would forfeit American support in 
future difficulties and any attack made from Finnish-controlled territory on war material 
dispatched from the United States to northern Russia would “create an immediate crisis in 
Finnish-American relations.”500 
On November 3, Hull held a press conference to discuss the Finnish issue with the 









Finland, but their warm regard should now be subjected to concern.501 Continued Finnish 
cooperation with Germany would eventually lead to the complete subjugation of Finland to the 
whims of Adolf Hitler. In addition, it would force the United States to abandon its friendly 
attitude towards Finland. For these reasons, and because the Finnish war assisted German war 
aims, the United States government would persistently seek to extradite Finland from the war. 
The United States realizes the difficulties of a separate Finnish-Soviet peace, he continued, but if 
the present Finnish policy is continued it must be because the Finnish government is no longer 
free.502 
The views of the internationalist press fell into line with the Administration, albeit with 
great misgiving and sympathy. The Hull press conference marks the point where the 
internationalist opinion in the United States came to terms with the fact that the Finnish war 
endangered American interests; yet internationalists maintained their ideological preference for 
Finland and the belief that Finland had been forced by geopolitical circumstances into fighting 
for its national interests. In a November press survey, 53% of the press coverage felt that Finland 
needed guarantees before it could make peace, while those who supported Hull’s warning 
apologetically attributed their support to the necessity that the Allies win the war.503 The New 
York Times acknowledged that by threatening the Murmansk railway and tying up Russian 








However, the Times also highlighted that from a Finnish perspective, a positive response to 
Hull’s demands would sacrifice Finland’s military security.505  
The New York Times editorial on November 4 was even somewhat critical of Hull’s lack 
of sensitivity toward Finnish policy. The Times declared that it was “natural” for Americans to 
side with Finland in the Soviet-Finnish war “because Finland herself had been the victim of 
unprovoked Russian aggression, and was regarded as merely taking advantage of an opportunity 
to recover territory which had been wrested from her by force.”506 The Times acknowledged that 
Finland was problematic to American foreign policy because “certainly Finland belongs to the 
democracies in this great struggle. Yet it would be blindness to reality not to recognize the 
dilemma in which the Finns find themselves. . . . Much as one may wish to see Finland withdraw 
from her Axis associations and return to the company of nations with ideals and aims more 
compatible to her own,” continued the Times, “it must be admitted that the democracies are 
remote and that Germany is strong and near.”507 To internationalists, Finland was a case of 
conflicting American interests: the necessity of adapting to the reality of power politics to win 
the war and preference for Finland’s right for self-determination. The Times summed up these 
sentiments: “Fundamentally . . . Finland is engaged in a struggle for security – a security which 
was pledged to small nations after the last war and then denied them. We cannot judge Finland 
too harshly until we ourselves are prepared to play our proper part in guaranteeing a peace that 








TIME lamented the circumstances that pitted American interests against Finnish national 
security, and endangered a warm relationship of “friendship and mutual trust that has few 
parallels in the history of nations.”509 TIME reported that it was with “sorrow and grave formality 
that [Hull] informed Finland that if she wants to continue to have good relations with the United 
States, she must discontinue war against Russia.”510 TIME declared that his was one of those 
“cruel, heart-sickening choices that must be made in times of crisis,” and “when he concluded 
Cordell Hull looked like a man who had been forced to spank his son.”511  
The Christian Science Monitor reminded its readers of America’s historical role as the 
champion of “national self-determination, often a life or death matter for small States.”512 The 
Monitor reiterated its ideological preference for Finnish values, but because of the overarching 
circumstances it sided with Administration: “the battle between those antagonists is a battle in 
which Americans cannot be neutral,” because the Soviet Union “is resisting an enemy which is 
‘the common enemy of all nations,’ the Nazi Third Reich.”513 However, the Monitor also 
acknowledged that Hull’s demand was baseless unless America could offer Finland assurances 
against the Nazis. 
Isolationists were outraged by Hull’s ultimatum and pointed to the obvious conflict 
between American ideals and American interests in the war. Herbert Hoover demanded to know 
if the United States had “lost all sense of human and moral proportions” and Senator Robert A. 










Daily Tribune proclaimed, “Hull Hits a New Low.”515 The Tribune staunchly defended Finnish 
policy stating, “It is Finland’s experience that Germany is a safer neighbor than Russia ever has 
been.” It reminded readers that the Allies had supported Finland in the Winter War but since then 
turned on Finland and supported Stalin.516 It declared, “the Hull declaration is an impertinence 
which marks a new low in American international relations. The United States has done nothing 
to help Finland defend itself or preserve its independence.”517 The Tribune continued its tirade 
by pointing out that Hull “ignores the fact that they have been the actual victims of Russian 
brutality and of aggression without conscience.”518 
 The Finns refused to connect the two wars and considered it an injustice that the west 
opposed its war with Russia. The Finnish press ignored the fact that the Finnish war directly 
affected the Allied cause and continued to assert that Finland was fighting a war of defence only 
on its own account. The Helsinki newspaper Sanomat wrote, “It is not difficult to understand 
what they want to achieve through this pressure. Everyone realizes that it is desired to make the 
Murmansk railway free for British-American transport. Apart from that it is desired to free the 
Russian troops that are engaged on our long front.”519 The Finns claimed that since America was 
neutral, it was impossible for the Finnish war to cause adverse effects on American security.520  
 Finnish-American relations did not come to the crisis that Hull predicted. Both nations 
countered the tension caused by the conflict of allies through a mutual willingness to 










relations with the United States and did not interrupt supplies to Russia from the north. The 
Finns thereby undermined German war aims for the sake of maintaining good relations with their 
own ideological preference. On December 6, the Finnish Army drew up defensive positions on a 
sustainable front between the natural barriers of Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega and refused to 
advance further east. In Hull’s opinion, when Finland limited its military activities to holding a 
defensive line it saved its relations with the United States.521 
 For the next three years the United States adopted the policy of steadily pressuring 
Finland to withdraw from the war while maintaining diplomatic relations – even with the United 
States deeply involved in the war. In 1942-1944 United States press coverage of Finland 
subsided because of the United States’ own involvement in the war and because there was little 
to report on the Finnish front. However, events and minor crises in Finnish-American relations 
still received attention, and American sympathy for Finland remained strong.522 The leading 
isolationist newspapers remained supportive of Finland throughout the war. None of the 
internationalist papers considered the Soviet territorial demands of Finland to be legitimate, and 
an examination of the internationalist press suggests that the positive image of Finland in the 
United States had staying power.523 A Gallup Poll in May 1942 showed that 84% of Americans 
wanted to see Finland offered generous peace terms by the Allies; and in December 1944 only 









The United States represented Finnish interests to the Soviet Union at the 1943 peace 
talks in Teheran. Roosevelt, together with Churchill, set definite conditions that Stalin respect 
Finnish independence, to which the Soviet Government complied with no objections.525 Only in 
June of 1944, as a final step to assist the Soviet drive to Berlin, did the United States briefly 
sever relations with Finland, to the deep regret of the American public.526 The staunchly 
internationalist Washington Post justified the diplomatic move, but had to clarify that “no matter 
what the State Department says,” Washington only acted to hasten the achievements of Allied 
military goals.527 However, it spoke for Americans when it said that the Finnish situation was 
“like a Greek tragedy, inexorable in its consequences because of what has gone before, painful to 
















Chapter 6: Conclusion 
1939 to 1941 marked a drastic shift in relations between Finland and the democratic great 
powers. During the winter of 1939-1940 Finland enjoyed the overwhelming emotional support of 
virtually the entire world, yet by the end of 1941 it was at war with Britain while desperately 
trying to salvage relations with the United States. Remarkably, Finland fought the two wars for 
very similar objectives – Finnish independence and security against the Soviet Union – yet 
although the west had applauded Finland’s courageous stand against the Soviets in 1939, it 
condemned the renewed Finnish struggle in 1941. 
 The key to understanding this about-face in Finnish-western relations is the geopolitical 
reversal that began in the spring of 1940. In 1939, the Finnish-Soviet war was an inspiration to 
the western world, a David and Goliath struggle with an easily distinguishable victim and villain. 
The Nazi-Soviet pact, although not an alliance, drew clear lines between good and evil in the 
minds of British and American popular opinion. When the powerful Soviet Union invaded the 
small democratic nation of Finland, the heroic resistance of the Finns naturally encouraged 
America and the western Allies at a time when the Allies were yet too weak to take action in the 
European war.  
The United States, with its basic hostility to ‘godless communism’ and totalitarianism, 
was predisposed to support Finland in the Winter War. Americans disliked the ideals of the 
Soviet system and shared common values with Finland. The idea of a small, debt-paying, 
democratic nation fighting for liberty against a communist aggressor resonated with American 
ideals of economic and political liberalism; the right of small states to self-determination; and 
opposition to totalitarianism. These shared values created a positive image of Finland in the 
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United States that was the key to good relations. The Winter War also took on a major role in 
domestic politics. For the first time, isolationists came to regard a European war as a just cause: 
something other than a mindless European affair. In 1940, for the first time since the First World 
War, the United States Congress approved limited intervention in a European war. Significantly, 
the Winter War won over isolationists in an allegiance that continued into 1941, when the 
renewed Finnish struggle ironically became a pillar of the isolationist argument to stay out of the 
war.  
The Winter War also inspired the British. Unlike the Americans, however, the British did 
not see the Winter War as an isolated struggle for self-determination between a totalitarian giant 
and a liberal democracy. Rather, the British saw the Winter War through the perspective of the 
European war. In the British viewpoint, Finland fought alongside the Allies in the world-wide 
struggle against aggression. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact caused much of the British public to 
see the Soviet Union as an enemy, or at least as a hostile state. Because of the British public’s 
perception of the Soviet Union, they shared with Finland the bond of a common enemy: a bond 
that naturally disintegrated when the Soviets entered the war as a British ally. At first Finland 
was an annoyance to British war policy. British and world opinion, and the League of Nations 
resolution motivated the British War Cabinet to extend token gestures of support to the Finns, 
which London considered a waste of valuable resources. When Finland looked as if it would 
hold out against the Soviet Union, the War Cabinet saw the opportunity to exploit the Finnish 
war for Allied purposes. Consequently, the British developed an intervention plan aimed at 
securing valuable German resources in the north and completing the economic blockade. When 
Finland outlived its usefulness, Britain turned its attention to Norway and Sweden. 
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The geopolitical shift began in the spring of 1940, when the Allied defeat in Norway led 
to a power shift that limited Finnish options for external support to Germany alone. Allied war 
policy contributed mightily to the shift which pushed Finland into the arms of Germany; yet it 
did not stop Britain from protesting when Finland, faced with renewed Soviet aggression, 
grasped at the final straw available. Finland was able to use Germany as leverage to stave off 
another Soviet invasion but the temporary solution and Finland’s geographic position tied 
Finland’s fate to the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. There was little or no 
room for Finland to manoeuvre in the event of war between them. The Soviet Union had plainly 
demonstrated its intention to annex Finland in the fall of 1940; Finland’s geography made 
Leningrad and the western frontier of Russia vulnerable to attack; and German troops already 
entered Finland with the transit rights granted to Germany in September 1940. If there was to be 
another war, the Soviet Union would attack Finland to secure its western borders and prevent 
Germany from using Finland as a base of attack. If Finland did not participate in war against the 
Soviet Union, Germany was in a position to either starve Finland into obedience or occupy it. 
The second Finnish-Soviet war that broke out in June 1941 was not strictly an isolated 
“Continuation War” of defence, as Finnish propaganda sought to portray it. The Finns stuck to 
this Fenno-centric simplification of their war in order to make it acceptable to both Germany and 
the western democracies, as they sought to navigate between the great powers. It was related to 
the greater European war because, however just the Finnish cause, it inherently helped German 
objectives while undermining the Allied cause. The interests of Finland and the democracies 
were unavoidably opposed. However, as a small state, Finland could not afford to see the greater 
picture. It would be pointless to blame Finland for its ‘choice.’ Finland’s choice was to either 
fight the Soviet Union, which had clearly demonstrated ill intent, or to forfeit its right to self-
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determination. Finland once again fought for the same objective of independence. This country 
had already proved that it was more than willing to stubbornly battle the Soviet Union to protect 
its national interests, alone if necessary; it would clearly fight again, and welcome external 
support from any patron, if its national integrity was once again at stake. Finland did its best to 
fight for independent interests, rather than Nazi goals. Even in the face of substantial German 
pressure, Finland was doggedly uncooperative, and refused to compromise by fighting for 
German objectives.  
The sympathy of the British Dominions and the United States for the Finnish cause in the 
second Finnish war demonstrated that the reversal of the geopolitical situation, rather than the 
nature of the Finnish war, was to blame for the change in relations with the west. British policy 
in the Winter War had been determined by opportunism and the realities of power politics. 
Therefore it was logical that in the second Finnish war the same determining factors would 
apply. Since Britain was committed to the European war, it held a global view of the situation. 
Finland was little more than an annoyance to British war policy. Britain would much rather have 
seen the Soviet Union annex Finland than to see Finland contribute one iota to the German war 
effort.  
The shift in the balance of power put Finnish objectives at odds with British war aims. 
Regardless of Finland’s limited objectives, the 1941 war with the Soviet Union was inherently 
related to the wider conflict because Finland’s success compromised the fighting capacity of 
Britain’s most important ally. As the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Richard Law, 
acknowledged in December 1941, it did not matter that Finland always claimed a defensive war 
because “it was obviously to the advantage of the Soviet Government as well as of His Majesty’s 
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Government that Finland should be induced if possible to withdraw from active hostility.”529 
Finnish claims, whether they were valid or not, were of secondary importance. Churchill 
personally regretted the reversal in relations between the two countries; but because of the 
realities of power politics, Britain found it necessary to declare war on Finland for the overall 
war aims. 
Since the British public had seen the first Finnish war through the prism of their own 
experience in the war, it was predictable that they would do so again in the second Finnish war. 
Because of this tendency, the public was both unable and unwilling to see the complexity of the 
Finnish situation. The Anglo-Finnish bond in the Winter War was largely based on the 
perception of a common enemy. The geopolitical shift changed those British perceptions: the 
Soviet Union was an ally and Finland the enemy. The British public oversimplified the new 
Finnish-Soviet conflict and fit it into their own view of the world war, just as they did in 1939 
when they saw Finland as an ally in the war against aggression. They failed to comprehend how 
Finland could fight alongside Germany against an ally of Britain. The public perceived the Finns 
to have betrayed the Allied cause, when in reality the Finns had fought for independent 
objectives in the Winter War and did so again in 1941. In contrast to Britain’s perception of the 
Winter War, in 1941 the Soviet Union was the victim and Finland was now the aggressor. 
In the United States, political realism prompted American internationalists to accept the 
Soviet Union as a vital ally but they retained their positive image of Finland; and because of their 
deeply rooted suspicion and opposition to communism, Americans understood Finland’s struggle 






right to exist against a communist threat. The American ideal of self-determination justified 
Finland’s struggle. Even Finland’s new association with Germany did not tarnish its image in the 
United States because internationalists recognized the complexity of Finland’s situation: Finland 
used Germany to support its national interests, just as America used the Soviet Union. In the 
interests of its own security, the United States took a global view of the situation but understood 
why Finland could not. Internationalists therefore adopted a conflicting view: sympathetic to 
Finland’s situation but supportive of the Soviet Union. The Roosevelt administration adopted an 
exceptional policy toward Finland that reflected those views. 
For isolationists, the nation that had proved that not all European wars were meaningless 
now became a prime example of the injustice of the greater war. Until the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor, isolationists were outraged that Roosevelt would indirectly support the Soviet 
Union against Finland by aiding it in the greater war. To isolationists, this scenario was immoral 
because of the conflict between American interests in the war and basic American ideals of 
democracy and self-determination.  
This striking contrast between British and American attitudes and policy toward Finland 
was partially due to their level of involvement in the war. In the winter of 1939-1940 Britain and 
France believed that aid to Finland out of sympathy would have been a foolish waste of valuable 
resources. However, the Finnish war and world opinion presented Allied war strategy with a 
unique opportunity to take the initiative by cutting Germany off from its vital iron ore resources. 
By the summer of 1941 Britain could ill afford to tolerate a Finnish war with its most important 
ally under any circumstances. They were far more desperate than the United States and their 
bond of friendship with Finland was less strong. Britain was heavily dependent on the Soviet 
133 
 
Union, which used its leverage to determine British policy toward Finland. The United States, on 
the other hand, was technically neutral and could afford to offer moral judgement during both 
Finnish wars. However, American-Finnish bonds survived even after the United States became 
involved in the war.  
The contrasting opinions between Britain and the United States were determined by 
essential differences in British and American worldviews. Both British and American policies 
toward Finland were shaped by their respective ideals for an international system that would best 
promote peace. Americans proved far more idealistic, while the British conformed to the realities 
of power politics. The British believed that the European system of fences and spheres of 
influence would promote good relations between neighbours. In contrast, the United States had 
spent its entire history dismantling the system of European imperialists and believed that spheres 
of influence promoted competition, rivalry and war.530 The British were willing to recognize 
Soviet interests in Europe but only to the extent of American toleration. In December 1941, the 
Foreign Office seriously considered offering the Soviet Union a deal for a postwar system that 
would recognize both a British and Soviet sphere of influence in Europe: between Finland and 
Sweden in northern Europe. The idea never materialized, but at its root were traditional British 
assumptions that small states were expendable to further the interests of great powers: yet 
another case in which Britain proved willing to sacrifice Finland for the sake of good relations 
with the Soviet Union.531  
The American concern in 1941 was that Britain’s determination to establish a sphere of 






Europe. America believed that a liberal international economy was essential for American 
prosperity, whereas spheres of influence could potentially limit American commerce. While 
Britain was willing to sacrifice Finland in its own interests, Americans had a vision of a liberal 
world in which the self-determination of small states would play a vital role. As a small 
democracy at war with America’s ideological nemesis, Finland came to represent American 
ideals of promotion and defence of democracy and liberal capitalism.532  
In summary, British policy toward Finland was the outcome of a practical response to its 
military situation; worldview that accepted spheres of influence and the notion of expendable 
small states; and willingness to compromise to further its relations with the Soviet Union. Britain 
would have been willing to accept Finland’s policy of co-belligerency with Germany had it not 
caused problems in Anglo-Soviet relations.533 In contrast, the United States was unwilling to 
sacrifice small states, particularly Finland, because it contradicted the American worldview. 
Furthermore, Americans were willing to accept Finland’s co-belligerency because it was 
consistent with American ideals, despite their active support of the Soviet Union against 
Germany. The second Finnish war fit the American belief that even small states have the right to 
self-determination. Because of America’s idealism and the deep roots of American-Finnish 
friendship founded in common values, it maintained its positive image of Finland even through 
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